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Essays on the effects of health policy payment systems in long-term care and end-of-life care institutions 
are studied.  In the arena of long-term care, state Medicaid agencies have recently implemented pay-for-
performance (P4P) programs to address poor quality of care in nursing homes.  Using facility-quarter 
level data from 2003 to 2010, we evaluate the effects of Medicaid nursing home P4P programs on clinical 
quality measures, relying on variation in the timing of P4P implementation across states.  Further, we 
exploit variation in the structure of states' programs to investigate whether programs that reward certain 
dimensions of quality are associated with larger improvements.  We find P4P decreases the incidence of 
adverse clinical outcomes by as much as 8%, and the improvements are concentrated among the measures 
that experienced an increase in their relative returns and share strong commonalities in production. 
In the Hospice industry, changes to the current reimbursement system are mandated by the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act.  The motivation stems from noticeable hospice utilization changes 
since the Medicare Hospice Benefit (MHB) introduced a per-diem reimbursement in 1983. This research 
analyzes the abilities of a multi-tiered payment system, and a simpler two-part pricing system, to 
accurately match Medicare payments with hospice patient costs.  Both systems improve on the current 
payment mechanism, while two-part pricing is the only system to maintain access to care for all MHB 
eligible patients. 
In addition, the question of how much disutility consumers incur driving to airports is estimated and used 
to define air travel markets.  Though an accurate definition of an economic market is important for any 
study of industry, there is no rule governing what exactly constitutes a market.  To define a market we 
must ask the question ``between which products do consumers substitute,'' knowing that the answer to this 
question will depend on how ``close'' products are to one another in product space, as well as how close 
they are to one another, and to consumers, in geographic space.  We estimate a discrete choice model of 
air travel demand that uses known information about the locations of products and consumers, which 
allows us to study substitution patterns among air travel products at different airports.  We evaluate the 
commonly used city-pair and airport-pair definitions of a market for air travel, and conclude that a city-
pair is the appropriate definition.  We also employ the Hypothetical Monopolist test for antitrust market 
definition, as defined by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, and conclude that the 
relevant geographic market for antitrust analysis is frequently more narrowly defined as an airport-pair. 
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Abstract
State Medicaid agencies have recently implemented pay-for-performance (P4P) programs to
address poor quality of care in nursing homes. Using facility-quarter level data from 2003 to
2010, we evaluate the effects of Medicaid P4P programs on nursing home clinical quality, relying
on variation in the timing of P4P implementation across states. Further, we exploit variation in
the structure of states’ programs to investigate whether programs that reward certain dimensions
of performance are associated with larger improvements. We find P4P decreases the incidence of
adverse clinical outcomes by as much as 8%, and the improvements are concentrated among the
measures that experienced an increase in their relative returns and share strong commonalities
in production.
JEL Classification: I18, D22.
Keywords: Nursing homes; quality of care; pay-for-performance; value-based purchasing; mul-
titasking model.
∗The authors would like to thank Andrew Beauchamp, Norma B. Coe, Don Cox, Julie Mortimer, John Turner,
Mathis Wagner, and participants at the Boston College Applied Micro Lunch, the University of Georgia, and the
American Society for Health Economists 4th Biennial Conference for valuable comments.
†Department of Economics, Boston College. Chestnut Hill, MA 02467. Email: buika@bc.edu
‡Corresponding Author. Department of Economics, University of Georgia. Athens, GA 30602. E-mail:
skira@uga.edu; Phone: 706-542-2120.
1
1 Introduction
Have state Medicaid pay-for-performance (P4P) programs led to improvements in measures of
nursing home clinical quality? For decades, poor quality of care in nursing homes in the United
States has been a concern of policy-makers and the public. Several regulatory initiatives have been
implemented to address the problem, such as mandated resident assessments, facility inspections,
and increased fines and sanctions imposed on nursing homes delivering poor care. Government
reports reveal, however, that many quality problems remain. More recently, state Medicaid agencies
have turned to market-based incentives by implementing P4P programs. Since 2000, 11 states have
implemented nursing home P4P programs through their Medicaid agencies; 10 have programs
currently in effect, and several more are planning programs.1 Under P4P, the reimbursement paid
to a nursing home is determined in part by the facility’s performance on predetermined measures
of quality. Thus, P4P affects the price margin directly to create incentives for nursing homes to
shift their focus from quantity of services provided to quality of care.
In this paper, we analyze the effects of state Medicaid nursing home P4P programs on clinical
quality measures by exploiting variation in the structure and timing of P4P implementation across
states. We use facility-quarter level data from 2003 to 2010 from Nursing Home Compare. The
data contains information on many clinical quality measures, which allows us to analyze whether
P4P led to improvements in targeted clinical areas at the expense of others or whether synergies in
care production led to positive spillovers to unrewarded measures. We exploit the heterogeneity in
the structure of states’ P4P programs to examine whether programs that reward certain dimensions
of quality and performance are associated with larger improvements. Such analysis allows us to
examine whether rewarding inputs to care or outcomes themselves lead to improvements in clinical
quality. In addition, we examine whether there are differential effects of P4P by facility ownership,
chain status, and market competition.
We find P4P led to decreases in the incidence of physical restraint use, pressure sores, pain,
and urinary tract infections, which are measures that are often tied to the P4P reward and also
1The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) recently completed the Medicare Nursing Home Value-
Based Purchasing Demonstration, which was a three year P4P project that began in July 2009 in three states. The
initiative aimed to improve the quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries in nursing homes.
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share commonalities in production. We find even larger reductions in physical restraint use and
the incidence of pressure sores when clinical quality measures are tied directly to the P4P financial
bonus. Given these two measures are the most commonly rewarded clinical outcomes, our results
are suggestive of possible “teaching to the test;” however, there is also a strong commonality in the
production of these measures in that pressure sore incidence is strongly linked to restraint use and
immobility. We find rewarding nursing homes with high Medicaid occupancy rates increases bouts
of anxiety and depression, and hinders improvements in other clinical outcomes. We interpret these
results as evidence that with increased Medicaid occupancy, staff can spend less time with each
resident and may be less likely to catch health declines early.
We also examine the additional effects of rewarding nursing homes that create a more homelike
environment for residents, a movement the literature refers to as “culture change.” Our results are
consistent with nursing homes responding to this P4P incentive by creating an environment where
residents have increased mobility and independence. Relatedly, we find P4P improves measures
related to resident mobility, such as pressure sores and time spent in bed or a chair, more in non-
profit facilities relative to for-profits, suggesting non-profit facilities made larger efforts to improve
the mobility and activity of their residents in response to P4P. We find larger improvements in
restraint use and pressure sore incidence in response to P4P in more competitive markets, but find
little evidence that there are differential effects of P4P by nursing home chain status.
This paper contributes to the literature on quality improvement in health care in several ways.
First, there is little empirical research on the impact of P4P in nursing homes. Several studies have
found mixed evidence that P4P programs improve quality in hospital and outpatient settings, but
multiple payers cover only small proportions of those markets, which weakens the effectiveness of
a single payer’s P4P program. Unlike these other health care settings, the nursing home market is
dominated by one payer (i.e. Medicaid). Medicaid residents make up about two-thirds of all nursing
home bed-days and state Medicaid programs are responsible for approximately half of all nursing
home spending. Thus, the effectiveness of state Medicaid P4P programs may be greater. Second,
the variation in the structure of P4P programs across states allows us to analyze which features of
P4P are associated with larger quality improvements, which provides insight on whether incentives
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tied to inputs in the production of care or incentives tied to outcomes lead to clinical quality
improvements. Further, we analyze whether improvements were concentrated among rewarded
clinical measures only or both rewarded and unrewarded measures. Such analysis helps us learn
about synergies in the production of nursing home care and whether facilities diverted resources
away from unrewarded measures to focus on targeted measures or made more general quality
improvements in response to P4P.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on nursing home P4P programs.
We present a principal-agent model to analyze P4P in the nursing home setting in Section 3. Section
4 describes the data and provides descriptive statistics. The empirical framework is discussed in
Section 5. Section 6 presents the main results and Section 7 presents robustness and sensitivity
analysis. A brief conclusion is presented in Section 8.
2 Background on Nursing Home Pay-for-Performance
In 1986, in response to quality problems in nursing homes, the Institute of Medicine published a
report calling for major changes in the monitoring of quality. The report led to mandated resident
assessments and regulatory controls such as fines and sanctions imposed on facilities delivering
poor care. The Institute of Medicine issued a follow-up report concluding that significant quality
problems still remained (Wunderlich and Kohler, 2000). With the limited success of improving
quality through regulatory and enforcement strategies, efforts have turned to market-based reforms,
such as public reporting and P4P.2 The rationale for these market-based reforms is as follows. The
quality of care provided by a nursing home is extremely multifaceted and many dimensions are
unobservable (Mukamel et al., 2007). As a result, the nursing home market is subject to asymmetric
information since consumers have difficulty assessing a facility’s quality of care, and this problem
is greater when consumers suffer from cognitive impairment (as is the case for a large portion
of nursing home residents). Thus, facilities face little incentive to compete on quality. Report
cards and P4P aim to address this market failure by providing consumers with more information
2In 1998, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released Nursing Home Compare (NHC), a web-
based report card of all Medicare and Medicaid-certified nursing homes, and in 2002, NHC was expanded to include
clinical quality measures. NHC also serves as the data for our study.
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on various dimensions of quality and by giving facilities monetary incentives to improve quality
(Konetzka and Werner, 2010). Specifically, under P4P, the reimbursement paid to a nursing home
is determined in part by the nursing home’s performance on measures of quality and/or other areas
of performance. This approach provides small modifications to the flat-rate per service system, in
which reimbursement is highest when the most services are provided, regardless of quality. The idea
behind pay-for-performance is that if better performance is rewarded with higher reimbursements,
facilities will aim to provide high quality of care.
Since states have considerable discretion in setting Medicaid reimbursement methods and rates,
some states have implemented P4P programs through their Medicaid agencies. Currently, 10 states
have existing P4P programs, with the first being implemented in 2000 in Vermont.3 Minnesota
had a P4P program in 2006 and 2007 but it is no longer in place. Several states, such as Arizona,
Indiana, Texas, Virginia, and Washington have plans to implement a nursing home P4P program
via their Medicaid agencies. Table 1 lists the states with P4P programs in place between 2000 and
2010 as well as the year the program took effect.4
P4P financial rewards are based on various measures of performance such as staffing, inspection
deficiencies, resident and family satisfaction, clinical quality, occupancy and efficiency, Medicaid
utilization, and culture change.5 Table 1 provides a summary of the measures used in each state’s
P4P financial reward calculation.6 Almost all states with a P4P program tie the financial bonus to
staffing, regulatory deficiencies, and resident satisfaction. Typically, the dimensions of staffing that
are rewarded include some combination of staff level, retention, and satisfaction. Deficiencies are
uncovered through inspections and are tied to the P4P bonus in a variety of ways. In some states,
financial rewards are withheld from nursing homes with severe deficiencies, while others tie the
bonus to a threshold such as few or no deficiencies.7 Resident and family satisfaction information
3Much of the information in this section is based on Arling et al. (2009), Briesacher et al. (2009), Werner et al.
(2010), and the authors’ own collection of information on state P4P programs through legislative documentation,
news releases, state Medicaid documentation, and state registers.
4Our data ends in 2010; thus, our analysis does not include the impact of the Massachusetts P4P program which
was implemented in 2012.
5The financial reward is typically a bonus or add-on to the nursing home’s per diem reimbursement rate, and is
discussed in more detail later in this section.
6We follow Werner et al. (2010) in the categorization of P4P performance measures.
7For example, in Oklahoma, facilities receive extra points for a deficiency free survey or for no care related
deficiencies and no non-care related deficiencies above level F. In Colorado, a nursing home cannot be considered
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is usually drawn from surveys given to residents that are conducted and analyzed by an independent
third-party or outside agency.8
Some states base P4P payments on clinical quality measures, which usually include physical
restraint use, pain, and pressure sores among others. Table 2 shows the various measures of clinical
quality that are rewarded in the states with programs that tie bonuses to clinical measures. A
few states reward occupancy and efficiency (i.e. low administrative or operating costs).9 Culture
change is rewarded in some states’ P4P programs with the goal of giving nursing homes a more
homelike environment. Some elements of culture change include resident privacy and comfort,
flexible dining and bathing schedules, and eliminating overhead paging.10 Last, some P4P bonuses
are tied to Medicaid utilization as measured by the number of Medicaid resident-days as a share of
all resident-days. Bonuses are calculated per resident-day; thus, this measure gives an additional
bonus to nursing homes with a large share of Medicaid residents.11
The P4P financial incentive is typically a bonus or add-on to the nursing home’s per diem rate.
In some states, the P4P add-ons are a fixed dollar amount (usually ranging from $1 to $6) and in
others they are a percentage (usually 1 to 4 percent) of the facility’s specific per diem rate. The
bonus is usually based on a point system or performance score that is converted into per diem
add-ons. States determine the importance of each measure included in their P4P program in the
final score calculation by assigning a predetermined weight to each measure. A nursing home is
evaluated for each measure based on either its ranking compared with other facilities in the state
for a P4P bonus if it has substandard deficiencies on any Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment
survey. In Utah, a nursing home cannot receive a bonus if they have violations at the “immediate jeopardy” level.
8For example, in Georgia, nursing homes exceeding the threshold of 85 percent or higher of “good” or “excellent”
ratings on the family satisfaction question, “Would you recommend this facility?” qualify for a P4P bonus.
9For example, in Kansas, a nursing home with an occupancy rate above 90 percent receives a point in their P4P
score, and a nursing home with operating expenses below 90 percent of the state median earns a point.
10For a more concrete example, in Colorado, P4P rewards a nursing home’s “home environment.” One of the
measures within the “home environment” category relates to public and outdoor spaces. Requirements for this
measure are: “Available public and outdoor spaces are designed for stimulation, ease of access, and activity. Minimum
requirement(s) with supporting documentation: Public spaces that allow for residents to remain as independent as
possible such as laundry and cooking pantry areas. These spaces should be comfortable and accommodating without
clutter and free of visible medical equipment storage” (Public Consulting Group Health and Human Services, 2010).
11For example, a nursing home in Oklahoma (Kansas) receives a bonus if it has Medicaid occupancy greater than
50 (60) percent. In Colorado, nursing homes with Medicaid occupancy that is 5 to 10 percent above the state average
receive a bonus. In Iowa, a nursing home with Medicaid utilization at or above the 50th percentile receives an add-on.
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or whether it achieved a predetermined target or threshold level.12 The points are summed across
all measures, and the final score is converted into a per diem add-on for all Medicaid resident-
days.13 The higher the score, the larger is the add-on. Funding for the P4P add-ons comes from
redistribution of existing Medicaid funds as well as new money set aside in Medicaid budgets.
The literature on the effectiveness of P4P in nursing homes is scarce. Norton (1992) analyzes
the results of a P4P experiment in the early 1980’s, in which 32 San Diego nursing homes were
randomly assigned into control or treatment groups with financial rewards for (1) accepting patients
requiring large amounts of assistance; (2) improved health and functional status within 90 days of
admission; and (3) prompt discharge of patients who then remain out of the nursing home for at
least 90 days. Norton (1992) finds facilities that were eligible for the financial bonus were more likely
to admit patients with severe disabilities and were more likely to discharge patients than nursing
homes in the control group who only received their normal per diem reimbursement. Residents in
the treatment group were also less likely to be hospitalized or die than those in the control group.
With the exception of one recent study, there has been little systematic evaluation of the
impact of nursing home P4P programs implemented since 2000 on quality of care.14 Werner et al.
(2013) test for changes in nursing home clinical quality under state Medicaid P4P programs in
the year after P4P implementation and two years post-P4P implementation, and find evidence of
improvements in physical restraint use, pain incidence, and developed pressure sores. Werner et al.
(2013) focus on six clinical outcomes commonly used by states to determine P4P payments. We
build upon their work by analyzing the effect of P4P on 15 clinical outcomes, many of which are not
rewarded by P4P, to learn how facilities reallocated resources in response to P4P and whether there
were positive or negative spillovers to unrewarded outcomes. Further, we exploit the variation in
12For example, in Georgia and for most of the measures in Ohio’s P4P program, the threshold for each measure is
exceeding the state average. In Iowa, about half of the measures are absolute scores based on predetermined criterion
while the other half are based on how well a facility performs relative to others.
13For example, in Colorado in 2010, a nursing home could earn up to 100 points. 80 to 100 points translates into
a $3 add-on; 61 to 79 points translates into a $2 add-on; 46 to 60 points translates into a $1 add-on; and, nursing
homes earning 0 to 45 points do not receive an add-on. In 2004, the average Medicaid per diem reimbursement in
Colorado was $143.75 (Grabowski et al., 2004).
14Arling et al. (2006) is an unpublished study of Iowa’s P4P program, which found general trends toward im-
provement in resident satisfaction, staff hours and retention, and nursing homes with deficiency-free surveys during
fiscal years 2003 to 2005. Evaluation of the recently completed Medicare Nursing Home Value-Based Purchasing
Demonstration is currently underway.
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program structure across states to analyze which P4P features lead to improvements, and we allow
for heterogeneous effects of P4P by ownership, chain status, and market competition to examine
which facilities and markets are most responsive to P4P incentives.
While little work exists on the impact of nursing home P4P programs, research on P4P in other
health care settings such as hospitals and individual health care providers provides little or mixed
evidence of its effectiveness, both in terms of process measures of care (such as staffing) and patient
outcomes (Petersen et al., 2006; Rosenthal and Frank, 2006). It is not clear, however, whether
the lack of significant quality improvements in other health care settings applies to nursing homes.
Rosenthal and Frank (2006) point out that having multiple payers covering a small portion of a
particular health care market may reduce responsiveness to a single payer’s P4P program. Since
there is no payer that dominates most hospital and outpatient markets, the multiple payer problem
may explain the lack of an effect of P4P in those settings. The nursing home market, however, is
dominated by Medicaid, which may increase the effectiveness of P4P.
3 Theoretical Framework
We present a principal-agent model to guide in the interpretation and intuition of our empirical
results presented below. The model follows directly from and uses the same notation as Mullen
et al. (2010). While Mullen et al. (2010) is an application of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) to
describe the response of physician medical groups to P4P, the framework can also be applied to the
nursing home setting with little modification. The agent (i.e. the nursing home) chooses quality
level, q, which is unobservable to the principal (i.e. the state Medicaid agency). Quality may consist
of several dimensions such that q = (q1, . . . , qJ). For example, the quality vector may capture nurse
and staff intensity and attention as well as the nursing home environment.15 B(q) is the benefit to
Medicaid, who we assume acts on behalf of its patients, and it is possible that B is unobservable to
Medicaid. The cost to the nursing home of investing in quality level q is denoted C(q). We assume
C is increasing in its arguments and convex. For simplicity, these costs can be interpreted as fixed,
15Quality, q, can equivalently be interpreted as the vector of efforts chosen in a standard Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991) multitasking model.
8
such as investment in nursing home infrastructure and technology, or variable, such as nurse and
staff time.
The state Medicaid agency observes a set of quality indicators y = (y1, . . . , yK) which depend
on q but do not fully reveal the nursing home’s choice of quality level. Examples of observed quality
indicators include clinical outcomes such as the percentage of residents with pain or bed sores, the
number of inspection deficiencies, or the results of a consumer satisfaction survey. We assume:
yk = µk(q) + εk, k = 1, . . . ,K (1)
where εk|q ∼ Fk (where Fk is the cumulative density function of εk), k = 1, . . . ,K, E(εk|q) = 0 and
E(εkεk′ |q) = 0 for all k and k
′. The nursing home’s production technology of care is represented by
µ, and we let µjk denote ∂yk/∂qj , which is the marginal increase in the expected value of quality
indicator yk from an increase in quality dimension qj . If two observable quality indicators yk and
yk′ both depend positively on qj , there is a commonality in the production of measures yk and yk′ .
For example, efforts to increase mobility of residents or restorative involvement may decrease the
incidence of pressure sores as well as the amount of time a resident spends in bed.16 Encouraging
staff to take more time to allow residents to perform daily activities by themselves, rather than
assist them in such activities may improve the number of residents who need help with activities of
daily living (ADLs) and perhaps decrease depression and anxiety by increasing residents’ confidence
and level of fitness (Lu, 2012).
We denote R(y) the Medicaid reimbursement to the nursing home. In states without a P4P
program, reimbursement does not depend on quality and is simply a fixed or flat-rate, thus R(y) =
r0.
17 The nursing home chooses q to minimize cost.18 Without a P4P program in place, the first
16In our empirical specification increases in the prevalence of clinical outcomes like pressure sores or pain are
deteriorations in those measures. The model above follows if yk is interpreted as the percentage of residents without
pressure sores, for example.
17In the 1980’s almost all state Medicaid agencies employed retrospective payment systems which reimburse nursing
homes based on their costs after care has been delivered. By 1997, most states moved away from the retrospective
payment system and instead reimburse nursing homes via a prospective payment (usually a facility-specific rate) or
flat-rate payment system (Grabowski et al., 2004; Miller et al., 2009). Under these payment systems, the rates are
set in advance of, rather than following the rate year, regardless of the actual costs incurred by the facilities during
the rate year. Thus, we assume the rate r0 is taken as given by the facilities.
18We abstract from quantity of services provided and focus only on the determination of the quality level as in
Mullen et al. (2010). A description of the model with demand included is presented in the Appendix.
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order condition from the nursing home’s minimization problem is:
∂C
∂qj
= 0, j = 1, . . . , J. (2)
The nursing home chooses a lower level of q than the social planner would; thus, allowing the
reimbursement to depend on y can improve the level of q to the efficient one.
In states with a P4P program, suppose the bonus scheme is simple: The nursing home is
rewarded additionally on observable quality signal yk in the amount of rk if yk reaches or surpasses
a threshold level, Tk, for k = 1, . . . ,K. Thus, the reimbursement to the nursing facility is:
R(y) = r0 +
K∑
k=1
rkI(yk ≥ Tk).
The nursing home is assumed to be risk neutral and maximizes expected profits:
E [R(y)]− C(q) = r0 +
K∑
k=1
rkPr(yk ≥ Tk)− C(q)
= r0 +
K∑
k=1
rk [Fk(µk(q)− Tk)]− C(q).
(3)
In the presence of P4P, the first order condition from the nursing home’s maximization problem is:
∂C
∂qj
=
K∑
k=1
rkµjkfk(µk(q)− Tk), j = 1, . . . , J, (4)
which says the nursing home chooses q by setting the marginal cost of improvement in quality
dimension j equal to the expected marginal revenue from increasing qj for j = 1, . . . , J . We assume
non-profit facilities are altruistic and maximize E[R(y)] + αB(q) − C(q), where 0 < α < 1. For
such facilities, the first order condition is:
∂C
∂qj
= α
∂B
∂qj
+
K∑
k=1
rkµjkfk(µk(q)− Tk), j = 1, . . . , J, (5)
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The non-profit nursing homes choose q to equate the marginal cost of quality improvement to the
marginal benefit which is composed of the expected marginal revenue from increasing q and the
marginal increase in the benefit to Medicaid (acting on behalf of its patients) from increasing q.
The marginal benefit of increasing qj is composed of: (1) ujk, the marginal increase in observed
quality measure yk; (2) rk, the add-on for performing above the threshold for measure yk; (3) the
probability of reaching the threshold for yk, k = 1, . . . ,K.
19 The model predicts that it is relative
prices, rkµjk, that matter. This is in line with standard multitasking theory which predicts when
there are changes to the relative returns across tasks, firms may have an incentive to reallocate
resources across different dimensions of quality without necessarily increasing overall quality. In
particular, nursing homes may shift resources toward rewarded quality indicators at the expense
of the unrewarded measures, or they may make more general quality improvements which improve
both rewarded and unrewarded measures. The technology of care, µ, determines in part which
response plays out. An unrewarded observed measure would be predicted to improve in response to
P4P if it shares commonalities in production with the (more) lucratively rewarded observed measure
set. In other words, if the unrewarded measure is strongly related to the quality dimension(s)
determining the rewarded observed measures, it is expected to improve. If an unrewarded measure is
weakly related, unrelated, or competes with rewarded measures for limited nursing home resources,
it may respond negatively to P4P.20 In addition, even if a measure is rewarded, if other measures
are rewarded more highly, or if they cost less to improve, the nursing home may not significantly
improve the less profitable measure.
4 Data
We use data from the publicly available Nursing Home Compare (NHC) database. NHC is a
web-based report card system created by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
that provides information on almost every nursing home in the United States. The clinical quality
19For non-profit facilities, there is also the marginal increase in the benefit to Medicaid, ∂B/∂qj .
20Cross-partial effects in the cost function are also important. For example, if ∂2C/∂qj∂qj′ > 0 so that increasing
quality dimension j increases the cost of increasing quality dimension j′ and if the P4P program more strongly
rewards observed measures related to dimension j, then quality dimension j′ may deteriorate.
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measures found in NHC are based on individual resident assessment data found in the Minimum
Data Set (MDS) that Medicare and Medicaid-certified nursing homes routinely collect on all resi-
dents at specified intervals during their nursing home stay. These assessments record information
about the resident’s health, physical functioning, mental status, and general well-being. The mea-
sures are defined as rates of particular outcomes at each nursing home, and some measures have
been adjusted to (partially) account for case-mix across nursing homes.21 The measures cover two
resident populations—(1) short-stay or post-acute residents who reside in a nursing home typically
following an acute-care hospitalization and involve high-intensity rehabilitation or clinically com-
plex care usually for less than 30 days; (2) long-stay or chronic care residents, who typically stay
in a nursing home (usually more than 90 days and often until death) because they can no longer
care for themselves at home. The MDS, and hence NHC clinical quality measures, are updated
quarterly. Our sample includes facility-level quarterly data starting in quarter 3 of 2003 to quarter
3 of 2010 (or 29 quarters).
We analyze the impact of P4P programs on the 15 clinical quality outcomes listed in Table 3.
Abt Associates (2004) describes the methodology used in calculating the measures. The number of
observations vary for each clinical measure since, for some nursing homes, the number of qualifying
residents was too small to report for that measure.22 The clinical outcomes take on values ranging
from 0 to 1.
NHC also contains information from the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR)
database maintained by the CMS. OSCAR consists of items collected during the state survey of
all Medicare and Medicaid-certified nursing homes in the US that is conducted approximately an-
nually.23 OSCAR data contains information on nursing home ownership, structure (whether the
facility is part of a chain; whether the facility is located within a hospital), occupancy rate, bed
21The MDS typically accounts for case-mix by using resident-level covariates, a facility admission profile, or both.
In some cases the MDS includes facility characteristics to control for the fact that some nursing homes may admit or
specialize in more impaired residents than other nursing homes.
22Facilities with fewer than 30 residents in the denominator for the long-stay measures or fewer than 20 residents
for the short-stay measures will not have their rates for that measure displayed on NHC. The reason is that the
denominator size has been determined too small (i.e. there are too few residents who are candidates for the particular
quality measure of interest) to produce a stable rate for the purposes of consumer reporting.
23Every facility is required to have an initial survey to ensure compliance. States are then required to survey each
nursing home at least every 15 months.
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size, staffing, and federal regulatory compliance.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
In total, the data consists of 435,327 nursing home-quarter observations. Table 4 shows summary
statistics for the full sample. Nursing homes located in states where P4P is in effect (the treatment
group) account for 11 percent of the sample. Table 5 displays the averages of the clinical quality
measures for the first year (2003) and the last year (2010) of the data split by whether or not the
state ever has a P4P program in place during the sample period. This allows us to compare nursing
homes in states which will eventually have a P4P program to their counterparts in a year when
few P4P programs are in effect.24 Columns 1 and 3 show the averages of each clinical measure
in 2003 in states which never implement P4P and in states which eventually do implement P4P,
respectively. Columns 2 and 4 show the corresponding values in 2010. The last column shows the
difference in clinical averages for P4P states between 2010 and 2003 minus the difference in never
P4P states between 2010 and 2003. For some measures, such as pain incidence and depression and
anxiety, there is descriptive evidence of significantly larger improvements in P4P states relative to
never P4P states. However, in order to accurately assess the effect of P4P programs on clinical
quality outcomes, we need to account for time trends, as well as differences across nursing homes
and states. For this we now describe our specific empirical strategy.
5 Empirical Strategy
To examine the impact of state Medicaid pay-for-performance programs on clinical quality, we
estimate the following equation:25
yist = βP4Pst + δi + λt + t ∗ νs + ǫist (6)
24Only Iowa and Vermont had programs in effect in 2003. We omit them from the descriptive statistics in Table 5
but include them in the estimation sample.
25We follow the same differences-in-differences setup as Grabowski and Town (2011) who examine the impact of
the introduction of Nursing Home Compare on clinical quality outcomes.
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where yist is the percentage of residents experiencing clinical measure y at nursing home i in state
s at time t,26 P4Pst is an indicator for having a pay-for-performance program in state s at time t,
δi and λt are nursing home and time fixed effects, respectively, t ∗ νs are state-specific linear time
trends, and ǫist is the error term. The inclusion of nursing home fixed effects allows us to control
for any nursing home and state time-invariant characteristics,27 and the time fixed effects control
for overall trends that might affect nursing home clinical quality. The inclusion of the state-specific
time trends accounts for differential trends in clinical quality across states over the time period of
our sample. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing home level.28
As with any identification strategy using variation in state policies, we must be concerned
with the exogeneity of the policy. Our results will be biased if P4P implementation is correlated
with unobserved state characteristics. The nursing home fixed effects should alleviate some of
this concern as they will capture state (and nursing home) time-invariant characteristics. The
state-specific time trends control for differential trends across states in clinical quality that could
also affect P4P implementation. Thus β, our coefficient of interest, is identified off within-nursing
home deviations (or breaks) from the state-specific time trends and differences in the timing of
P4P implementation across states. Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that P4P
implementation across states is uncorrelated with changes in other factors that are not captured
in the state-specific trends. That is, discontinuous time-varying factors or breaks from the trend
which affect clinical quality are not related to the implementation of P4P.29,30 As a check on the
26Time is measured in quarters, taking on values corresponding to 1 to 29.
27Nursing home characteristics such as ownership, number of certified beds, and profit status do not vary within
a nursing home over time (or vary very little); thus, we do not include these variables in the regressions since they
are captured in the nursing home fixed effect. NHC does not contain data on the wages paid to staff or other input
costs; thus, we cannot control for these costs.
28Standard errors clustered at the county level provide qualitatively similar results.
29An example of a violation of this assumption is a statewide nursing home scandal which leads the state to
implement a P4P program. In such a case, our estimate of β will likely be attenuated. We can then interpret β
as a lower bound on the effect of P4P. Through extensive searches of news archives and state documentation, we
have found no evidence that P4P implementation is linked to scandals. We would overestimate the effect of P4P
if implementation tends to occur when states experience dramatic improvements in quality. We find no evidence of
such a case.
30From extensive searching of state documentation, it seems the state budgetary situation plays a large role in the
adoption of P4P rather than nursing home scandals or other changes in clinical quality. For example, the Virginia
Department of Medical Assistance Services issued recommendations in 2007 for the creation of a state nursing home
website and the implementation of a Medicaid P4P program. Action on the plan, however, has been delayed due to
budget considerations.
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exogeneity of P4P implementation, we consider the effects of adding a placebo implementation,
which we present in Section 7.
We do not have information on whether a nursing home actually received the P4P bonus or
participated in the P4P program (in states where P4P participation is voluntary);31 thus, our
estimate of β is more appropriately viewed as the intention to treat effect.32 As a result, β is
likely attenuated and represents a lower bound on the effect of P4P since it includes the impact on
nursing homes that do not respond to or do not participate in the incentive program.
5.1 Heterogenous Effects
The heterogeneity in the structure of P4P programs across states allows us to analyze whether
rewarding certain dimensions of performance lead to larger clinical improvements than others. We
exploit the variation in the structure of states’ P4P programs to examine the impact not just of
having a P4P program, but the additional impact of having a P4P program that rewards a certain
performance measure. We are not able to examine the impact of every performance measure since
there is often not enough across state variation in whether that particular measure is rewarded.33
Thus, we focus on the additional impact of programs that reward clinical quality measures directly,
Medicaid utilization, and culture change. We estimate the following equation:
yist = β1P4Pst + β2P4Pmeasurekst + δi + λt + t ∗ νs + ǫist (7)
where P4Pmeasurek is an indicator for whether a state with a P4P program bases their reward
at least in part on performance measure k, where k is either clinical quality measures, Medicaid
utilization, or culture change. We estimate Equation 7 separately for the k quality dimensions of
interest. While coefficient β1 is the effect of having a P4P program on clinical measure y, coefficient
31Participation rates vary in states where P4P is voluntary. For example, in Oklahoma, 98 percent of nursing
homes participate; in Utah, about 80 percent of facilities submit an application; and, in Vermont, about 25 percent
of nursing homes have attempted to get the award (Miller et al., 2013). According to various state reports, about
half of the nursing homes in Colorado participated in the incentive program in fiscal year 2009.
32We cannot compute which nursing homes were eligible to receive the P4P bonus since we do not have all the
necessary data, such as resident satisfaction surveys and facility cost reports.
33For example, all states with a P4P program reward staffing measures in some way; all but one P4P state base
rewards on consumer satisfaction; and, all but two states reward low regulatory deficiencies.
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β2 measures the additional impact of P4P programs that reward performance measure k.
We also examine whether there are differential effects of P4P on clinical quality based on
facility characteristics such as ownership and chain affiliation. To analyze the differential effects by
ownership we estimate:
yist = β1P4Pst + β2(P4Pst ×NFPist) + β3(P4Pst ×Govist) + δi + λt + t ∗ νs + ǫist (8)
where NFP is an indicator for a non-profit nursing home and Gov is an indicator for a government
nursing facility (with for-profit nursing homes as the omitted group). To analyze the differential
effects by chain status we estimate:
yist = β1P4Pst + β2(P4Pst × Chainist) + δi + λt + t ∗ νs + ǫist (9)
where Chain is an indicator for being part of a nursing home chain (i.e. owned by a company
that owns or operates two or more nursing homes). We are interested in these differential effects
since several studies have found that for-profit nursing homes are associated with poorer quality
of care than non-profit facilities (Comondore et al., 2009). In addition, nursing home chains have
often been found to have lower staffing levels, poor patient clinical outcomes, and more regulatory
deficiencies (Harrington et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2009). In 2009, the US General Accountability
Office found the worst performing nursing homes tended to be for-profit chain facilities.34 Thus,
we may expect these facilities to respond differentially to P4P incentives.
Last, we analyze whether there are differential effects of P4P by the degree of local market
competition. We estimate:
yist = β1P4Pst + β2(P4Pst ×HHIist) + δi + λt + t ∗ νs + ǫist (10)
where HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), calculated as the sum of squared market
shares of all nursing homes in each county.35 We may expect differential effects of P4P in more
34http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09689.pdf
35We follow the standard in the literature and use the county to approximate the market for nursing home care
and base market shares on the number of nursing home beds (Park et al., 2011; Park and Werner, 2011; Grabowski
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or less competitive markets since facilities in more competitive areas have an additional incentive
to improve quality to increase market share. Since P4P increases the potential marginal profit per
Medicaid resident and facilities in more competitive areas face a larger elasticity of demand with
respect to quality, facilities in competitive markets may be more responsive to P4P.
6 Results
The baseline results from the estimation of Equation 6 are presented in Table 6. A separate
regression is run for each clinical quality measure and the coefficient on P4P is shown for each re-
gression. We find P4P led to improvements in some clinical measures, particularly those commonly
rewarded in states that directly link the P4P bonus to clinical outcomes. For example, among long-
stay residents, we find P4P significantly decreases the incidence of physical restraint use, pressure
sores (among low-risk residents), moderate to severe pain, and urinary tract infections by 0.2, 0.1,
0.4, and 0.2 percentage points respectively, which amounts to 3.5 percent, 4.3 percent, 8.0 percent,
and 2.3 percent decreases from their averages. We find that P4P decreases the percentage of long-
stay residents who lose too much weight and short-stay residents with moderate to severe pain by
0.2 and 1.2 percentage points, respectively, which amounts to 2.4 and 5.9 percent decreases from
their averages. Thus, there is some possible evidence of “teaching to the test” since we find the
clinical quality improvements are mostly concentrated among a subset of the measures commonly
tied to the P4P financial bonus.
At the same time, the areas where we find improvements are where there are some commonali-
ties in production. For example, residents who are restrained daily can become weak and develop
pressure sores and other medical complications. Efforts to reduce physical restraint use may have
had spillovers to bed sore incidence. We also find evidence of a decrease in inappropriate weight
loss, which is only rewarded in two state P4P programs. There are several reasons a resident may
lose weight including not being fed properly, medical care not being properly managed, or the nurs-
ing home’s nutrition program is poor. Too much weight loss can make a person weak and can cause
the skin to break down which can lead to pressure sores. Efforts to improve the nutrition program,
and Town, 2011; Clement et al., 2012).
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nutritional interventions, and/or ensuring staff spend enough time feeding those who cannot feed
themselves may decrease inappropriate weight loss, which could also lead to a decrease in pressure
sores. The decreases in pain could certainly be linked to the decreases in pressure sores, restraint
use, and urinary tract infections. Thus, our results are in line with the theoretical model in that
improvements would be expected among outcomes that experience an increase in their relative
returns and share strong commonalities in production with other outcomes that have experienced
an increase in their returns.
Importantly, we do not find evidence that P4P led to significant worsening of any clinical mea-
sures, providing some evidence that P4P is not associated with improvements in targeted clinical
measures at the expense of unrewarded dimensions of clinical quality. These results are similar to
those of Mullen et al. (2010) which studies the impact of P4P introduction among physician medical
groups in California. They find some paid measures improved in response to the incentive program,
but did not find any evidence of positive or negative spillovers to other unrewarded aspects of care.
Our results are also quantitatively similar to those of Werner et al. (2013), who find small but
significant improvements in pain, developed pressure sores, and restraint use one and two years
following state Medicaid P4P implementation.
The responsiveness of pain among short-stay residents is similar to that found in the literature
on the effect of public reporting on nursing home clinical quality. Zinn et al. (2005) use NHC data
to analyze whether trends in published quality measures improved after public reporting, and found
pain, particularly among short-stay residents, was one of the few clinical measures which displayed
a clear, significant trend toward improvement. Mukamel et al. (2008) and Werner et al. (2009)
also find pain among short-stay residents improved after publication of NHC. Thus, it seems the
incidence of pain is especially responsive to market-based reforms.36
36It is possible the observed improvements in pain reflect changes in data reporting rather than true improvements
in care (Zinn et al., 2005). In fact, Werner et al. (2011) find evidence of a decrease in short-stay resident risk of
pain after the introduction of public reporting, which could be attributed to changes in the documentation of pain or
downcoding. It is also possible that the observed improvements in pain are due to “cream skimming” (i.e. selection
of patients to make scores look better). Werner et al. (2011) find evidence of a change in short-stay patient sorting
with respect to pain after public reporting, resulting in high-risk patients being more likely to go to higher-scoring
facilities and low-risk patients more likely to go to lower-scoring nursing homes. Mukamel et al. (2009) analyze
whether nursing homes responded to the publication of NHC by adopting cream skimming admission policies by
examining trends in six clinical measures among newly admitted residents. They find only the percentage of newly
admitted residents with pain declined after public reporting and this decline was larger among nursing homes with
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6.1 Heterogeneous Effects
Tables 7-9 show the results from estimation of Equation 7. Separate regressions are run for each
clinical measure. We find evidence that nursing homes in states with P4P programs that reward
clinical quality outcomes directly experience significant improvements in physical restraint use and
pressure sore incidence (among long-stay low-risk residents), while nursing homes in states with
programs that do not reward clinical outcomes do not experience significant improvements in these
measures (Table 7). However, rewarding clinical measures directly does not have any additional
impact on the incidence of moderate to severe pain. Thus, in states with programs that directly
reward clinical outcomes, there is again evidence of “teaching to the test” and a strong commonality
in production between the two clinical measures most commonly used in the P4P calculation.
Table 8 shows the impact of P4P and the additional impact of programs that reward Medicaid
utilization on clinical quality. Werner et al. (2010) note that by targeting financial bonuses towards
nursing homes with a large share of Medicaid patients, P4P may decrease disparities between fa-
cilities, since nursing homes that predominantly serve Medicaid patients are often poorly financed,
have fewer nurses, and have lower quality of care (Mor et al., 2004).37 Compared to the baseline
results we find several more improvements in outcomes, especially unrewarded outcomes, but they
are concentrated among the states that do not reward Medicaid usage.38 In fact, we find evi-
dence of increases in depression and anxiety in states with programs that reward Medicaid usage.
Perhaps when increased Medicaid occupancy is encouraged, staff can spend less time with each
resident, which may mean less time supervising and allowing residents to perform daily routines
on their own. Such declines in independent physical activity can worsen depression and anxiety
(Lu, 2012). More generally, many of these measures may improve simply by increasing efforts to
more accurately and frequently assess residents. More accurate assessments may lead to catching
declines and risk factors early and getting therapy or restorative involvement when necessary. With
poor pain management and control at the baseline, suggestive of possible cream skimming. We explore the cream
skimming possibility in Section 7.1.
37NHC does not contain data on the proportion of nursing home residents covered by Medicaid; thus, we cannot
analyze whether rewarding Medicaid utilization decreases disparities between nursing homes with small and large
Medicaid populations.
38For example, we find significant decreases in the percentage of residents who spend most of their time in bed or
a chair, who experience bowel or bladder incontinence, and who are more depressed or anxious for nursing homes in
states that do not reward Medicaid usage.
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increased Medicaid occupancy, nursing homes may find it more costly and difficult to perform such
assessments and therefore the relative return to clinical quality improvements falls.
We find nursing homes in states that tie P4P bonuses to culture change experience significant
decreases in the percentage of long-stay low-risk residents with pressure sores and the percentage of
long-stay residents with urinary tract infections (Table 9). Culture change typically involves allow-
ing residents to have more independence and creating a more homelike environment, which likely
means residents move about the nursing home more. Such increased mobility would decrease the
incidence of pressure ulcers and subsequent infections. However, we find rewarding culture change
increases the incidence of pain among both long and short-stay residents. Again, since culture
change likely allows residents to be more mobile, this may lead to an increase in pain. The increase
in pain could also be explained by the fact that sometimes residents may refuse pain medications
(or take less) and to accept a certain level of pain so they can stay more alert. This may be more
common in facilities where there is activity and resident independence is encouraged.
These results are in line with the theoretical model presented above. When culture change is re-
warded, the relative return to quality measures that promote resident independence, mobility, and
activity increase. Improvements along these dimensions have positive spillovers to clinical quality
indicators such as pressure sore incidence. On the other hand, improvements along such dimen-
sions are likely to increase the incidence of pain. Even though pain incidence may be rewarded,
when measures related to resident independence and nursing home environment are rewarded more
highly, the nursing home may not improve the less profitable measure, especially if it does not
share strong commonalities in production with the more lucratively rewarded measures. We also
interpret these results as evidence that some patient outcomes can be improved not only by tying
incentives directly to outcomes but also to inputs in the production of care, such as the nursing
home environment.
Table 10 shows the impact of P4P on clinical measures by chain status. Generally, our results
are similar to those of our baseline regressions and we find no significant differential effects by
chain status. Table 11 shows the impact of P4P on clinical outcomes by nursing home ownership.
Similar to our baseline results, we find P4P significantly decreases the incidence of pain, urinary
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tract infections, and inappropriate weight loss. For these measures we do not find differential effects
by ownership. However, we find P4P decreases the percentage of long-stay low-risk residents with
pressure sores, the percentage of long-stay residents who spend most of their time in bed or in
a chair, and the percentage of short-stay residents with pressure sores more in non-profit nursing
homes relative to for-profit nursing homes. These findings reveal strong commonalities in the pro-
duction of care for non-profit facilities, especially since the percentage of residents spending most of
their time in bed or a chair is typically not rewarded in P4P programs. Pressure sores are usually
caused by constant pressure on one part of the skin, usually from chairs, beds, or restraints. Efforts
to make sure residents are mobile and do not stay in one position would decrease the percentage
of residents spending most of their time in bed or a chair as well as pressure sore occurrence. It
is not clear, however, why only non-profits would experience such strong commonalities in produc-
tion. We hypothesize that improvements related to mobility and activity bring large benefits to
Medicaid residents in terms of B(q) and since non-profits are assumed to be altruistic, they will
focus improvements where there are commonalities in care production and where there are large
benefits to Medicaid residents.
Last, Table 12 shows the impact of P4P on clinical quality by local market competition. We
find facilities in more competitive markets experience significantly larger improvements in pressure
sore incidence and restraint use in response to P4P relative to facilities in less competitive mar-
kets. The magnitude of the impact implied by these results is meaningful. In a market with an
HHI of 0.5, the equivalent of a market with two equally sized nursing homes, the results imply
facilities experienced no change in pressure sore incidence among long-stay low-risk residents in
response to P4P. However, in a market with an HHI of 0.2, the equivalent of a market with five
equally sized nursing homes, the results imply facilities experienced a 5.2 percent improvement in
pressure sore incidence in response to P4P. Grabowski and Town (2011) examine whether the im-
pact of the introduction of Nursing Home Compare on clinical outcomes differs with local market
competition, and similar to our results, find improvements in pressure sore incidence are larger in
more competitive markets. We speculate that pressure sore incidence and restraint use are more
responsive to market-based reforms in more competitive markets since these are the two measures
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most studies, consumers, and policy-makers emphasize as signals of nursing home quality of care.
Thus, in markets where competition on quality is more likely, facilities may target improvements
towards measures that receive the most attention from consumers, and may be even more likely to
do so when those improvements are rewarded by a P4P program.
7 Robustness Analysis
7.1 Patient Selection and Cream Skimming
It is possible the improvements in the clinical measures we find are due in part to nursing homes
adopting cream skimming or cherry picking admission policies in response to P4P. If this were the
case, nursing homes in states with P4P programs would attempt to admit the patients who are less
sick or frail and less likely to experience adverse clinical outcomes. By admitting these low-risk
patients, the facility could increase its likelihood of receiving a P4P bonus. We examine whether
there is evidence of cream skimming by analyzing whether there are differential impacts of P4P on
nursing homes most likely to exhibit cream skimming policies–those with high occupancy rates.
Cream skimming can be especially costly if the alternative to not admitting a high-risk patient
is keeping a bed empty. This cost is greater for facilities with low occupancy rates than those
with high occupancy rates or at full-capacity (Mukamel et al., 2009). In addition, when a nursing
facility becomes capacity constrained, this constraint can affect which patients the facility chooses
to admit. Thus, nursing homes with high occupancy rates may have larger incentives to cream
skim in response to P4P. We re-estimate Equation 6 adding an interaction between P4P and an
indicator for the nursing home’s occupancy rate being greater than 90 percent. About 46 percent
of facilities in our sample have occupancy rates above 90 percent.39 Results are shown in Table
13. We generally do not find that high occupancy nursing homes respond differentially to P4P,
except they experience significantly larger improvements in the incidence of pain among short-stay
residents. This result is consistent with that of Mukamel et al. (2009) who analyze whether nursing
homes responded to the publication of NHC by adopting cream skimming admission policies. They
3940 percent of nursing homes in P4P states have occupancy rates above 90 percent.
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find only the percentage of newly admitted residents with pain declined after public reporting,
suggestive of possible cream skimming. Thus, with the exception of short-stay pain incidence, we
do not find evidence of high occupancy nursing homes cream skimming in response to P4P.
7.2 Placebo Analysis
As a check on the exogeneity of P4P implementation, we consider the effects of adding a placebo
implementation to our main results. We re-estimate Equation 6 adding a placebo dummy that is
set to one exactly two years before P4P was implemented in each state.40 We would expect these
placebos to have an effect if states implemented P4P programs in response to changes in clinical
quality (i.e there is reverse causality in Equation 6). The results are displayed in Table 14. We
generally find that the placebo is not statistically significant, and that the effects of P4P are virtually
unchanged compared to the baseline. For long-stay residents with pain, we find the impact of the
placebo is positive and significant but only at the 10 percent level, and the main effect of P4P is
the same as in the baseline estimation. We interpret these results as evidence that the impact of
P4P is not capturing some other intervention or event that may have preceded the implementation
of the incentive programs.
In addition to the placebo analysis above, we also checked that other nursing home policies and
regulations were not systematically changing at the same time P4P programs were adopted. For
example, none of the P4P states experienced changes in the presence of a case-mix reimbursement
policy or a bed-hold policy during the sample period.41 In addition, none of the P4P states
experienced changes in certificate of need (CON) laws during the sample period, which are laws
that require providers to seek approval from the state for new construction or expansion of nursing
facilities. Nursing staff ratio laws changed in just two P4P states during the sample period—Georgia
in 2004 and Minnesota in 2005. Some states experienced changes in bed tax policies, which allow
40In other words, we add a two year lead of P4P implementation to investigate whether these leads can predict
changes in clinical quality. We choose two years since P4P programs typically take that long to move through state
legislature.
41Case-mix reimbursement systems adjust payments to facilities based on resident acuity level. Bed-hold refers
to a policy in which the state pays the nursing home to hold a Medicaid resident’s bed if the resident requires a
hospital admission. All P4P states except Oklahoma have case-mix reimbursement policies and all P4P states except
Colorado and Utah have bed-hold policies.
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states to assess a tax on nursing facilities in order to generate new in-state funds and match them
with federal funds so that the state gets additional federal Medicaid dollars. We find no systematic
pattern in the timing of bed tax adoption and P4P implementation. For example, both Colorado
and Maryland implemented a bed tax effective in fiscal year 2008 (within two years prior to P4P
implementation in those states), while Iowa and Kansas implemented a bed tax in 2010, more than
five years after P4P implementation. Our results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to
those presented when we control for the existence of a state bed tax.42
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the effect of state Medicaid pay-for-performance programs on nursing
home clinical quality. We find P4P led to reductions in the incidence of physical restraint use, pres-
sure sores, pain, urinary tract infections, and inappropriate weight loss among long-stay residents,
as well as a decrease in pain among short-stay residents. The improvements are concentrated among
the subset of clinical measures that are commonly tied to the P4P bonus, suggestive of “teaching
to the test.” However, if P4P has been designed to help nursing homes focus on the clinical quality
dimensions that matter most, then “teaching to the test” could benefit residents. In addition,
many of these measures share commonalities in production in that they would improve in response
to nutritional interventions, efforts to reduce restraint use, and/or increased staff attention. Thus,
our results are consistent with the multitasking model presented in that improvements would be
expected among the outcomes that experience an increase in their relative returns and share strong
commonalities in production. Importantly, we do not find evidence that P4P has negative spillovers
to unrewarded measures of clinical quality.
We then take advantage of the heterogeneity in P4P program structure across states to examine
whether there are additional impacts of rewarding certain dimensions of performance. We find nurs-
ing homes in states with programs that directly reward clinical outcomes experience significantly
42Facility-level Medicaid reimbursement rate data is not available, but we obtained data from 2003 to 2009 on
the average Medicaid per diem reimbursement at the state-level from LTCfocus.org (constructed as total Medicaid
nursing home spending in the state divided by the total number of Medicaid days in nursing homes). Our results are
quantitatively similar to those presented when controlling for the state average Medicaid reimbursement rate.
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larger improvements in physical restraint use and pressure ulcer incidence than nursing homes in
states with programs that do not reward clinical measures. Rewarding Medicaid occupancy in-
creases depression and anxiety among residents and hinders improvements in other clinical areas,
which we suspect is due to staff having less time to spend with each resident. Interestingly, we
find nursing homes in states with programs that link their P4P bonus to culture change experience
decreases in the incidence of pressure sores, but increases in the incidence of pain. We attribute
this result to facilities making efforts to increase the activity, independence, and mobility of their
residents in response to the culture change incentive.
We find the impact of P4P differs between for-profit and non-profit nursing homes. P4P de-
creases the percentage of residents with pressure sores and who spend most of their time in bed or
in a chair more in non-profit facilities relative to for-profit nursing homes. These results suggest
that in response to P4P implementation, non-profit facilities made larger efforts to improve the
mobility and activity of their residents, perhaps because non-profits behave altruistically and such
improvements bring large benefits to their patients. We also find that P4P led to larger improve-
ments in pressure sore incidence and restraint use in more competitive markets, suggesting P4P
may be more effective in markets where facilities are more likely to compete on quality.
Policy-makers may find our results useful for the future design and implementation of P4P
programs. While we find strong evidence of improvements when the financial reward is tied to the
clinical outcomes themselves, we also find some improvements can be made by rewarding the inputs
to the production of care such as the nursing home environment. In addition, improvements can
be expected when the outcomes that share strong commonalities in production are rewarded. Last,
our finding that P4P improves at least some clinical measures in the nursing home setting (where
Medicaid is the dominant payer), provides some evidence that the multiple payer problem may
indeed pose a barrier to the effectiveness of P4P in other health care settings. This is a particularly
important consideration given Medicare is the majority payer in the post-acute care market.
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Appendix
We present the theoretical model above extended to include demand for nursing home services
by Medicaid patients. Let a nursing home’s Medicaid patient demand be given by n(q) where n is
the number of Medicaid patients. Demand only depends on quality, q, since Medicaid patients pay
zero out of pocket. Demand is assumed to be increasing in quality. We augment the cost function
so that it is now dependent on the number of Medicaid residents, C(q, n(q)). Cost is assumed to
be increasing in both quantity and quality.
Without a P4P program in place, the first order condition from the nursing home’s minimization
problem is:
∂C
∂qj
+
∂C
∂n
∂n
∂qj
=
∂n
∂qj
r0, j = 1, . . . , J, (11)
which reflects the fact that an increase in quality dimension j now leads to a marginal increase in
demand.
In states with a P4P program, the expected profit function becomes:
E [R(y)]− C(q, n(q)) = n(q)
[
r0 +
K∑
k=1
rkPr(yk ≥ Tk)
]
− C(q, n(q))
= n(q)
[
r0 +
K∑
k=1
rk [Fk(µk(q)− Tk)]
]
− C(q, n(q)).
(12)
In the presence of P4P, the first order condition from the nursing home’s maximization problem is
now:
∂C
∂qj
+
∂C
∂n
∂n
∂qj
=
∂n
∂qj
[
r0 +
K∑
k=1
rkPr(yk ≥ Tk)
]
+ n(q)
[
K∑
k=1
rkµjkfk(µk(q)− Tk)
]
, j = 1, . . . , J.
(13)
Compared to the original model, the marginal benefit of increasing qj now also consists of the
marginal increase in revenue (which may include a P4P add-on) from the increase in demand
induced by an increase in qj .
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Table 2: Clinical Measures Rewarded
Clinical Measure Colorado Georgia Maryland Minnesotaa Oklahoma
Physical restraint use X X X X X
In-dwelling bladder catheters X X X
Infections Xb X X
New falls Xb X X
Inappropriate weight loss X X
Moderate to severe pain X X X
Pressure sores X X X X X
Vaccination rates X X
This table is largely based on Table 2 in Werner et al. (2010) with updates based on the authors’ collection
of legislative documentation and state registers.
aMinnesota also based rewards on resident behavior, depression/anxiety, bowel/bladder incontinence,
burns, skin tears or cuts, inappropriate antipsychotics use, change in functional status, and change in
walking/mobility.
bThese measures were added to Colorado’s program in 2010 but were not part of their 2009 program.
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Table 3: Nursing Home Clinical Outcomes
Long-Stay N
Residents who were physically restrained. 394,083
Low-risk residents with pressure sores. 190,765
High-risk residents with pressure sores.a 296,745
Residents who have moderate to severe pain. 390,664
Residents with a urinary traction infection. 394,079
Residents who have/had a catheter inserted and left in their bladder. 390,975
Residents whose ability to move about in and around their room got worse. 337,949
Residents whose need for help with daily activities has increased. 376,565
Residents who spend most of their time in bed or in a chair. 393,580
Residents who lose too much weight. 348,006
Residents who lose control of their bowels or bladder. 340,986
Residents who are more depressed or anxious. 391,002
Short-Stay N
Residents with pressure sores. 273,660
Residents who had moderate to severe pain. 299,010
Residents with delirium. 296,798
aHigh-risk residents for pressure sores are those who are impaired in bed mobility or transfer, who are
comatose, or who suffer from malnutrition. Low-risk residents are those without the aforementioned
conditions.
Observations are at the nursing home-quarter level.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean
P4P 0.110
Nursing Home Characteristics
Government owned 0.059
Non-profit 0.331
For-profit 0.609
Chain member 0.532
Hospital based 0.062
Beds: 0-49 0.112
Beds: 50-99 0.370
Beds: 100-149 0.335
Beds: 150-199 0.115
Beds: 200+ 0.068
HHIa 0.214
Occupancy > 90% 0.458
Clinical Quality Measures
Long-Stay Physically Restrained 0.057
Low-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores 0.023
High-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores 0.125
Long-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain 0.050
Long-Stay Urinary Tract Infection 0.088
Long-Stay Catheter Left in Bladder 0.057
Long-Stay Ability to Move Worsened 0.121
Long-Stay Need for ADL Help Increased 0.154
Long-Stay Spend Most Time in Bed/Chair 0.042
Long-Stay Lose Too Much Weight 0.084
Long-Stay Lose Control of Bladder/Bowels 0.486
Long-Stay More Depressed/Anxious 0.144
Short-Stay Pressure Sores 0.167
Short-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain 0.204
Short-Stay Delirium 0.022
Observations are at the nursing home-quarter level.
aCalculated as the sum of squared market shares of all nursing homes
in each county, where market shares are measured using total number
of beds.
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Table 6: Impact of P4P on Clinical Quality Measures
P4P
Long-Stay Physically Restrained -0.002∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Low-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores -0.001∗∗
(0.0007)
High-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores -0.0004
(0.001)
Long-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.004∗∗∗
(0.0009)
Long-Stay Urinary Tract Infection -0.002∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Long-Stay Catheter Left in Bladder -0.0004
(0.0006)
Long-Stay Ability to Move Worsened 0.002
(0.001)
Long-Stay Need for ADL Help Increased 0.002
(0.001)
Long-Stay Spend Most Time in Bed/Chair -0.0005
(0.0005)
Long-Stay Lose Too Much Weight -0.002∗∗
(0.0008)
Long-Stay Lose Control of Bladder/Bowels -0.003
(0.002)
Long-Stay More Depressed/Anxious -0.0009
(0.001)
Short-Stay Pressure Sores -0.0002
(0.002)
Short-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.012∗∗∗
(0.003)
Short-Stay Delirium -0.0004
(0.0008)
Significance Levels: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Each coefficient is from a separate regression. Standard errors are
clustered at the nursing home level. Observations are at the nursing
home-quarter level. Clinical outcomes take on values ranging from 0
to 1. Regressions also included nursing home and time fixed effects as
well as state-specific linear time trends.
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Table 7: Impact of P4P and Rewarding Clinical Measures on Clinical Quality Measures
P4P P4P Clinical
Long-Stay Physically Restrained 0.002 -0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Low-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores 0.0004 -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
High-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores 0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Long-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.004∗∗ -0.0002
(0.002) (0.002)
Long-Stay Urinary Tract Infection -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Long-Stay Catheter Left in Bladder -0.0004 0.000
(0.0009) (0.001)
Long-Stay Ability to Move Worsened 0.0008 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Long-Stay Need for ADL Help Increased 0.0002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Long-Stay Spend Most Time in Bed/Chair 0.0003 -0.001
(0.0009) (0.001)
Long-Stay Lose Too Much Weight -0.0008 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Long-Stay Lose Control of Bladder/Bowels 0.002 -0.007∗
(0.003) (0.004)
Long-Stay More Depressed/Anxious 0.002 -0.005
(0.002) (0.003)
Short-Stay Pressure Sores 0.0009 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Short-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.010∗∗ -0.003
(0.004) (0.005)
Short-Stay Delirium -0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Significance Levels: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing
home level. Observations are at the nursing home-quarter level. Clinical outcomes take
on values ranging from 0 to 1. Regressions also included nursing home and time fixed
effects as well as state-specific linear time trends.
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Table 8: Impact of P4P and Rewarding Medicaid Utilization on Clinical Quality Measures
P4P P4P Medicaid Utilization
Long-Stay Physically Restrained -0.003∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Low-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores -0.002∗∗ 0.0008
(0.0009) (0.001)
High-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores -0.002∗ 0.004∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Long-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
Long-Stay Urinary Tract Infection -0.002∗ -0.0009
(0.001) (0.001)
Long-Stay Catheter Left in Bladder -0.0006 0.0003
(0.0008) (0.001)
Long-Stay Ability to Move Worsened 0.003∗∗ -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Long-Stay Need for ADL Help Increased 0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Long-Stay Spend Most Time in Bed/Chair -0.001∗∗ 0.001
(0.0006) (0.001)
Long-Stay Lose Too Much Weight -0.003∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Long-Stay Lose Control of Bladder/Bowels -0.005∗∗ 0.005
(0.003) (0.004)
Long-Stay More Depressed/Anxious -0.005∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Short-Stay Pressure Sores 0.00004 -0.0005
(0.002) (0.003)
Short-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.014∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.004) (0.005)
Short-Stay Delirium 0.0005 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Significance Levels: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing
home level. Observations are at the nursing home-quarter level. Clinical outcomes take
on values ranging from 0 to 1. Regressions also included nursing home and time fixed
effects as well as state-specific linear time trends.
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Table 9: Impact of P4P and Rewarding Culture Change on Clinical Quality Measures
P4P P4P Culture
Long-Stay Physically Restrained -0.002∗∗ -0.003
(0.0008) (0.002)
Low-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores -0.0005 -0.005∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.002)
High-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores -0.0005 0.001
(0.001) (0.003)
Long-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.005∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.002)
Long-Stay Urinary Tract Infection -0.001∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.0008) (0.002)
Long-Stay Catheter Left in Bladder -0.0004 0.00008
(0.0006) (0.001)
Long-Stay Ability to Move Worsened 0.002 0.0003
(0.001) (0.003)
Long-Stay Need for ADL Help Increased 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.003)
Long-Stay Spend Most Time in Bed/Chair -0.0005 0.00005
(0.0005) (0.002)
Long-Stay Lose Too Much Weight -0.002∗∗ 0.002
(0.0008) (0.002)
Long-Stay Lose Control of Bladder/Bowels -0.002 -0.005
(0.002) (0.005)
Long-Stay More Depressed/Anxious -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
Short-Stay Pressure Sores 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.004)
Short-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.014∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.003) (0.007)
Short-Stay Delirium -0.0004 -0.0005
(0.0009) (0.002)
Significance Levels: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing
home level. Observations are at the nursing home-quarter level. Clinical outcomes take
on values ranging from 0 to 1. Regressions also included nursing home and time fixed
effects as well as state-specific linear time trends.
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Table 10: Impact of P4P on Clinical Quality Measures by Chain Status
P4P P4P×Chain
Long-Stay Physically Restrained -0.002 -0.0005
(0.001) (0.002)
Low-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores -0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗
(0.0009) (0.0009)
High-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Long-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.003∗∗ -0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Long-Stay Urinary Tract Infection -0.002∗∗ -0.00005
(0.001) (0.001)
Long-Stay Catheter Left in Bladder -0.0002 -0.0004
(0.0008) (0.0009)
Long-Stay Ability to Move Worsened 0.001 0.0007
(0.001) (0.002)
Long-Stay Need for ADL Help Increased 0.001 0.0009
(0.002) (0.002)
Long-Stay Spend Most Time in Bed/Chair -0.001∗ 0.002
(0.0008) (0.001)
Long-Stay Lose Too Much Weight -0.002∗ -0.00004
(0.001) (0.001)
Long-Stay Lose Control of Bladder/Bowels -0.005∗ 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Long-Stay More Depressed/Anxious -0.0004 -0.0009
(0.002) (0.002)
Short-Stay Pressure Sores -0.0009 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Short-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.010∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Short-Stay Delirium -0.0005 0.0001
(0.001) (0.001)
Significance Levels: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing
home level. Observations are at the nursing home-quarter level. Clinical outcomes take
on values ranging from 0 to 1. Regressions also included nursing home and time fixed
effects as well as state-specific linear time trends.
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Table 11: Impact of P4P on Clinical Quality Measures by Nursing Home Ownership
P4P P4P×NFP P4P×Gov
Long-Stay Physically Restrained -0.002∗ -0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Low-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores -0.0006 -0.002∗∗ -0.002
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.002)
High-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores -0.0004 -0.0007 0.004
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Long-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.004∗∗∗ -0.00006 0.0003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Long-Stay Urinary Tract Infection -0.002∗∗∗ 0.0009 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Long-Stay Catheter Left in Bladder -0.0008 0.0006 0.002
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.002)
Long-Stay Ability to Move Worsened 0.002 -0.0004 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Long-Stay Need for ADL Help Increased 0.0006 0.002 0.004
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Long-Stay Spend Most Time in Bed/Chair 0.0008 -0.003∗∗ -0.004∗
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.002)
Long-Stay Lose Too Much Weight -0.002∗∗ -0.0003 0.003
(0.0009) (0.001) (0.003)
Long-Stay Lose Control of Bladder/Bowels -0.004 0.003 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008)
Long-Stay More Depressed/Anxious -0.001 0.002 -0.0007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Short-Stay Pressure Sores 0.002 -0.007∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Short-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.012∗∗∗ -0.003 0.016∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009)
Short-Stay Delirium -0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Significance Levels: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing home
level. Observations are at the nursing home-quarter level. Clinical outcomes take on values
ranging from 0 to 1. Regressions also included nursing home and time fixed effects as well as
state-specific linear time trends.
41
Table 12: Impact of P4P on Clinical Quality Measures by Local Market Competition
P4P P4P×HHI
Long-Stay Physically Restrained -0.003∗∗∗ 0.006∗
(0.001) (0.003)
Low-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores -0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.0008) (0.002)
High-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores 0.0002 -0.003
(0.001) (0.005)
Long-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.005∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.001) (0.004)
Long-Stay Urinary Tract Infection -0.002∗∗ 0.0002
(0.001) (0.003)
Long-Stay Catheter Left in Bladder -0.0006 0.001
(0.0008) (0.002)
Long-Stay Ability to Move Worsened 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.004)
Long-Stay Need for ADL Help Increased 0.002 0.0002
(0.002) (0.004)
Long-Stay Spend Most Time in Bed/Chair 0.0002 -0.003
(0.0009) (0.003)
Long-Stay Lose Too Much Weight -0.0008 -0.004
(0.001) (0.003)
Long-Stay Lose Control of Bladder/Bowels -0.0004 -0.011
(0.003) (0.008)
Long-Stay More Depressed/Anxious -0.002 0.007
(0.002) (0.005)
Short-Stay Pressure Sores -0.003 0.013∗
(0.002) (0.007)
Short-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.015∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.003) (0.011)
Short-Stay Delirium -0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.004)
Significance Levels: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered at the
nursing home level. Observations are at the nursing home-quarter level. Clinical
outcomes take on values ranging from 0 to 1. Regressions also included nursing
home and time fixed effects as well as state-specific linear time trends.
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Table 13: Impact of P4P and High Occupancy on Clinical Quality Measures
P4P P4P × High Occupancy
Long-Stay Physically Restrained -0.002∗∗ 0.0006
(0.001) (0.001)
Low-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores -0.001 -0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0007)
High-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores 0.0005 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Long-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.004∗∗∗ -0.0001
(0.001) (0.001)
Long-Stay Urinary Tract Infection -0.002∗ -0.0004
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Long-Stay Catheter Left in Bladder 0.0002 -0.001
(0.0007) (0.0006)
Long-Stay Ability to Move Worsened 0.002∗ -0.0009
(0.001) (0.001)
Long-Stay Need for ADL Help Increased 0.002 1.00e-05
(0.001) (0.001)
Long-Stay Spend Most Time in Bed/Chair -0.0001 -0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Long-Stay Lose Too Much Weight -0.002∗∗ 0.0009
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Long-Stay Lose Control of Bladder/Bowels -0.004∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Long-Stay More Depressed/Anxious -0.0007 0.0009
(0.002) (0.002)
Short-Stay Pressure Sores 0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Short-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.009∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Short-Stay Delirium 0.0002 -0.0004
(0.001) (0.001)
Significance Levels: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing
home level. Observations are at the nursing home-quarter level. Clinical outcomes take
on values ranging from 0 to 1. Regressions also included nursing home and time fixed
effects as well as state-specific linear time trends.
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Table 14: Impact of P4P and Placebo Law on Clinical Quality Measures
P4P Placebo
Long-Stay Physically Restrained -0.002∗∗ 0.0008
(0.0008) (0.0007)
Low-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores -0.002∗∗ -0.0008
(0.0007) (0.0008)
High-Risk Long-Stay Pressure Sores -0.00004 0.00007
(0.001) (0.001)
Long-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗
(0.0009) (0.001)
Long-Stay Urinary Tract Infection -0.001∗ 0.002
(0.0008) (0.0009)
Long-Stay Catheter Left in Bladder -0.0004 -0.00003
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Long-Stay Ability to Move Worsened 0.002∗ -0.003∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Long-Stay Need for ADL Help Increased 0.001 -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Long-Stay Spend Most Time in Bed/Chair -0.0006 0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Long-Stay Lose Too Much Weight -0.002∗∗ -0.0003
(0.0008) (0.001)
Long-Stay Lose Control of Bladder/Bowels -0.001 0.0008
(0.002) (0.002)
Long-Stay More Depressed/Anxious -0.001 0.0001
(0.001) (0.002)
Short-Stay Pressure Sores 0.0003 0.0003
(0.002) (0.002)
Short-Stay Moderate to Severe Pain -0.011∗∗∗ -0.0009
(0.003) (0.003)
Short-Stay Delirium -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0009)
Significance Levels: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Each row represents a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered at the nursing
home level. Observations are at the nursing home-quarter level. Clinical outcomes take
on values ranging from 0 to 1. Regressions also included nursing home and time fixed
effects as well as state-specific linear time trends. The placebo dummy is set to one
exactly two years before the actual implementation of P4P in each state.
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1 Introduction
Changes to the current hospice reimbursement system are mandated by the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The motivation stems from noticeable hospice utilization changes
since the Medicare Hospice Benefit (MHB) introduced a per-diem reimbursement in 1983. This
paper analyzes the abilities of a multi-tiered payment system, and a simpler two-part pricing system,
to accurately match Medicare payments with hospice patient costs. Both systems improve on the
current payment mechanism, while two-part pricing is the only system to maintain access to care
for all MHB eligible patients.
Despite much payment reform discussion, there had not been significant progress towards real
reform until the ACA mandate. The heart of the debate is how to adjust the routine home care rate
which accounts for more than 95% of all hospice care days. In three decades under the MHB, the US
hospice industry has experienced several structural changes, leaving the current payment system
lacking in ability to align provider incentives with the hospice mission. This paper studies two
proposed hospice payment reforms to the routine home care rate and discusses their strengths and
weaknesses. Both proposals aims to align the routine care reimbursement rate with the differences
in care utilization over the course of a patients hospice stay. The Medicare Payment Advisory
Committee (MedPAC) suggests a multi-tiered payment structure which increases reimbursements
during the most costly days of a patients stay and reduces payments elsewhere. The second proposal
suggests a two-part pricing system which pays hospices a lump sum reimbursement at the beginning
of a patients stay. This payment accounts for the costly days of care, and uses a lower per-diem
rate afterwards to equate the policies. Recommendations are made, from the perspectives of both
patients and from the financially responsible CMS.
The paper proceeds with the history of hospice’s growth and structural changes in section
2. Section 3 discusses the related literature which has both, instigated and, been motivated by
discussions of payment reform. Section 4 presents the data and trends in the hospice industry.
Section 5 provides policy analysis, and section 6 concludes.
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2 What is hospice
The US hospice movement began in 1974, 7 years after the first hospice, St. Christopher’s
Hospice, in London, UK. Hospice is a form of “end-of-life” service focusing on caring for, rather
than curing, terminally ill patients. It aims to provide high quality care to ease physical and
emotional pain experienced by both, the patient and their family. Hospice care differs from curative
treatment in its ability to provide care in your own home. Not only do many patients appreciate
this convenience, according to the National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization (NHPCO,
2008), but Medicare and other insurance companies avoid a lot of curative treatment which requires
expensive, and immobile, machines. In addition to care at home, hospice is provided in free-standing
hospice centers, hospitals, nursing homes and other long-term care facilities.
In order to be eligible for Medicare covered hospice, a physician must certify a patient’s life
expectancy is six months or less. According to the NHPCO in 2007, approximately 1.4 million
patients received hospice care. Of this group, 930,000 patients died under care, implying approx-
imately 39% of US deaths were under hospice care. Since 2003, the number of patients receiving
hospice care has grown 47% from 950,000 to 1,400,000. The number of hospices in the US has
grown steadily as well, reaching more than 4,700 in 2007 (NHPCO). As baby boomers reach older
ages, demand for hospice care is expected to continue to grow.
Beginning in 1982 with the enactment of the Medicare Hospice Benefit (MHB), Medicare pays
for almost 85% of patients. This makes hospice a unique industry in which traditional market
“prices” do not exist. Under the MHB, Hospices are reimbursed in predetermined per diem rates,
determined by the type of care being provided. There are four types of hospice care: routine home,
general inpatient, continuous, and respite care. Routine home care is the most common form of
care and is provided at the patients residence. Continuous care can also be received at home, and
implies round the clock nursing service is provided. General inpatient care and respite care are
both received at the hospices inpatient facility (if they have one).
Under the MHB, hospices received the following rates for the 2010 fiscal year:
Rates vary greatly to account for differences in the labor and capacity utilization necessary for
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Table 1: Reimbursement Rates: 2010
Type of Care Rate Wage Component Non-Weighted Amount
Routine Home Care $142.91 $98.19 $44.72
Continuous Home Care $834.10 $573.11 $260.99
Inpatient Respite Care $147.83 $80.02 $67.81
General Inpatient Care $635.74 $406.94 $228.80
the inpatient and continuous types of care. We next look at the utilization rates amongst patients
to see routine home care is the predominate type of care provided. Table 2 shows estimates from
the National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization (NHPCO):
Table 2: Patient Care Days by Care Type
Type of Care 2010 2011
Routine Home Care 95.7% 97.1%
Continuous Home Care 1.2% 0.4%
Inpatient Respite Care 0.2% 0.3%
General Inpatient Care 2.9% 2.2%
Routine home care has a reimbursement rate of $142.91 in 2010, meaning hospices must be
operating with average costs per patient per day roughly around this rate or lower.
3 Related literature
Issues of resource utilization and payment reform have been discussed since Huskamp et al.(2001)
suggested the payment methodology no longer reflected hospice costs. In 2002, Lorenz et al. set
out to evaluate the relationship of hospice profit status to patient selection and service delivery. To
do this they analyzed responses to the 1997 California Office of State-wide Health Planning and
Development (OHSPD) annual home care and hospice survey. In reduced models, for-profit hospices
reported 17% more discharges with non-cancer diagnoses, 15% more long-term care referrals, and
8% more patients with government payers. They also found the availability of chemotherapy and
radiotherapy to be unrelated to tax status. This is the first paper to my knowledge, which compares
differences in outcomes by tax status.
Nicosia et al. (2004) are the first to document the “potential” behavioral incentives created
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by the Medicare hospice payment system. They employ visit data from a large national chain of
hospice providers to answer three main questions. How well does the per diem system reflect current
hospice resource use? Should case mix adjustments be considered? Are the beginnings and ends
of hospice stays more intensive? Their results show that the hospice payment system does reflect
resource use and that attempting to adjust for case mixes would not substantially improve the
system’s performance. In this sense, case-mix refers to the percentage of patients with a diagnoses
of cancer. They do find however that the beginnings and ends of hospice stays are more expensive
and thus suggest that the per diem system could be adjusted to better capture this variation in
costs within stays.
Lindrooth and Weisbrod (2007) study whether the fixed Medicare payment system creates in-
centives for hospices to increase their patients average length of stay (LOS) through the mechanism
of admitting patients sooner after a hospital discharge. They find that for-profit hospices are sig-
nificantly less likely to admit patients with shorter, less profitable, expected LOS, but find no
difference in the timing of admission by tax status.
Ohri (2008) follows up on Lindrooth and Weisbrod (2007) by studying an alternative hypothesis
in which hospices respond to the incentive to increase LOS. She uses the same OHSPD data used
by Lorenz et al. for the years 2002-2004, supplemented with data on quality deficiencies collected
by California Department of Health Services. Ohri asks whether the Medicare payment system
creates incentives for patient selection via referral networks and attempts to increase cost savings
via quality reductions. She finds that for-profit hospices are 12.6% more likely to receive patient
referrals from long-term care facilities, which refer a larger majority of non-cancer patients than
does the average referral. Non-cancer patients have been shown to have longer LOS than the
average patient, thus lowering average cost per day. Ohri also finds that for-profit hospices are 94%
more likely to have quality of care deficiencies and 221% more likely to have any kind of quality
deficiency.
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4 Data
4.1 Hospice cost reports
This paper uses the hospice cost reports collected by the OSHPD in the California Department
of Health Services. The data matches the national hospice cost reports as well as geographic data
to better understand a hospice’s service area. Specifically, we see the number of patients from each
county cared for by each hospice. The data is aggregate level and includes variables such as: exact
address, state of operation, profit status, total patient days by type of care, patient counts, Medicare
billed hours, average length of stay, salary data by type of employee, as well as other costs. The
data includes indicators for free-standing hospices, both Medicare certified and non-certified and
tax status. There are 1773 firm-year observations spanning the years of 2002-2009 for California.
A total of 334 separate hospice firms are operating during at least part of this time period.
Table 3 provides some basic statistics for California’s hospice market. Note there is a large
variance in the size of hospice firms, ranging from 10 to more than 12,000 patients in a year.
On average, roughly 70 patients per hospice are alive at the time of data collection, seen as the
discrepancy between the average number of total patients and those discharged. For reference,
California’s average LOS during the period of analysis is 46.42 days, substantially lower than the
national average LOS of 67.4 days in 2010.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Total Std. Dev
Total Patients 435.15 583.57
Discharged (death incl) 365.32 426.97
Staff Visits 16187.06 29313.48
Avg LOS (discharges) 46.42 days 17.25
These measure do not fully capture the trends in the hospice market. The hospice industry has
been growing both prior to, and faster since, Taylor et al. (2007) published evidence that hospice
care saves CMS money. The number of California hospices has nearly doubled during the period
in the data. Discharges per hospice have declined despite increases at the State-level, indicating
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increased competition. The last column of table 4 shows that average LOS (in days) has increased
during the period. Two reasons for this might be, 1) hospices are working harder to find more
profitable patients as their patient loads decline, or 2) the marginal patients entering the hospice
market are living longer. Research has shown evidence that hospices have adjusted their referral
networks to obtain more patients with long expected LOS (Ohri, 2008). The later explanation
makes sense if patients are becoming more aware of the hospice industry, and CMS is pushing to
have physicians refer patients to hospice earlier.
Table 4: Trending Statistics
Year Firms Discharges LOS
2002 162 398.62 41.00 days
2003 178 397.58 41.21
2004 192 398.20 42.74
2005 200 397.44 45.94
2006 220 384.65 48.56
2007 247 359.49 48.53
2008 274 334.04 48.95
2009 300 304.94 49.61
And both of these reasons are consistent with hospice firms acknowledging that the cost of a
patient’s stay is most expensive the first and last days of care (Huskamp, 2001). These behavioral
and strategic business changes are the motivation for reforming the per-diem reimbursement to
remove the ‘optimal patient game’ so that hospice can return to its stated mission: “to be the
model for quality, compassionate care for people facing a life-limiting illness or injury, hospice care
involves a team-oriented approach to expert medical care, pain management, and emotional and
spiritual support expressly tailored to the patient’s needs and wishes.” 1
5 Payment Reform Ideas
In large part, hospice payment reform is focused on reducing CMS expenditures. Between 2000
and 2007, Medicare hospice spending more than tripled (Abt 2012, MedPAC 2013). Coupled with
1http://www.nhpco.org/about/hospice-and-palliative-care
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spending increases, concerns have been voiced about lax admissions and recertification procedures
by hospices and affiliated physicians. Central to the reform debate is that the current system is not
well aligned with the intensity of care throughout a patient’s stay with hospice. Thus, the reform
which has the largest support in CMS is to adjust the per diem reimbursement rates to account for
higher costs in the first and last days of care.
I look at two potential solutions: 1) MedPACs tiered payment system, and 2) a two-part pricing
model adding a lump sump payment to the current system.
5.1 MedPAC Model
MedPAC (2013), using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) wage data, find that 68% of hospice
expenses are wages. They advocate for an adjustment to the annual wage component to connect
payments to costs over time for a given patient. Looking at the reimbursement rates from 2010
in table 1, one can see that 68% is in line with the wage component. MedPAC suggests that the
labor costs in the first seven days of care are 197% more than days 8 to 14. Further, days 15 to 30
represent 95% of the cost of days 8 to 14 and care after 30 days costs only 86% as much as care on
days 8 to 14. This does not account for the final 7 days prior to a patient’s death, when labor costs
increase significantly. Their estimate of the cost of these final seven days is an additional 115%
(based on days 8 to 14) increase. Thus, a patient enrolled in hospice for more than 30 days would
have costs in the final 7 days equal to 201% of days 8-14 (i.e. 86% + 115%).
Using these values, we can compute the change in payments in a multi-tiered payment reform
to the current policy. A hospice’s total reimbursement for a patient in 2010 (using Table 1) now
takes the following form:
Rev =
7∑
i=1
I(LOS >= i)98.19 ∗ 1.97 +
14∑
i=8
I(LOS >= i)98.19
+
30∑
i=15
I(LOS >= i)98.19 ∗ .95 +
LOS∑
i=31
I(LOS >= i)98.19 ∗ .86
+
LOS∑
i=LOS−6
I(i > 0) ∗ 98.19 ∗ 1.15 +
LOS∑
i=1
44.72
(1)
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The first four components depend on a patient’s LOS, the fifth summation accounts for the
final seven days of care while the final component tacks on the non-wage component which is paid
for every day of care provided to the patient by the hospice. For comparison, equation 2 below is
the current reimbursement rate:
Rev =
LOS∑
i=1
(98.19 + 44.72) = LOS ∗ 142.91 (2)
Equation 1 makes large payments in the initial days of care, decreasing the relative financial
benefits of long LOS patients. A patient with LOS of less than 131 days will net the hospice more
in reimbursements than the current system, whereas patients with LOS greater than 131 days will
net the hospice less in reimbursements compared to the current policy. Figure 1 below shows this
graphically.
[Figure 1 – Presents total CMS payments for a patient with each LOS. Calculations by author.]





















	
	
































	














	
	


In the figure, MedPAC Model is the proposed reform, while current policy represents the current
fixed per diem rate. A hospice with a patient whose LOS is 7 days (the first cut-off point) will
receive $2,457.51 instead of $1,000.37, a 145.7% increase. At 14 days (the second cut-off point),
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the difference of $1,457.14 is a 72% increase. At 30 days (the third cut-off point), the increase is
$1,378.59 or 32.16%. Since the average LOS in California hospices’ is 46.42 days, they will receive
an average increase in payments of 17.63% per patient. Now consider how this payment reform will
change the average per diem rate. Figure 2 below shows this.
[Figure 2 – Presents avg per-diem CMS payments for a patient by LOS. Calculations by author.]
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Again, MedPAC Model is the proposed reform, while current policy is the current fixed per diem
rate. There is no visual increase in the per diem rate during the last seven days of care as this
amount is averaged across each day of the LOS. When the per diem rates equalize at 131 days, the
mechanisms are paying the same total reimbursement.
The proposed payment reform is feasible, given payment commences upon completion of a
patients hospice stay. It reduces the incentive hospices face to seek out long LOS patients, or
implement lax admissions and recertification processes. However, total payments are unlikely to
decrease substantially under this new system. In the 2009 OSHPD data, Medicare made total
payments of $765,000,000 under the current payment system. We do not know exactly how hospices
will react to influence their LOS numbers in response to this policy. With no response, Medicare’s
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total payments in the MedPAC system will be 1.8% higher at $779,000,000.
Revisions to the weights placed on each segment of a patient’s stay are necessary to lower CMS
expenditures in order to avoid increasing CMS outlays for services that the market already provides
at current rates. One way to do this is to consider the following ‘more extreme’ policy which further
reduces the wage component to 75% for all patients with LOS greater than 180 days. The timing
of this change exactly coincides with a patient’s recertification, thereby reducing the incentive to
improperly readmit. Total reimbursements now take the following form:
Rev =
7∑
i=1
I(LOS >= i)98.19 ∗ 1.97 +
14∑
i=8
I(LOS >= i)98.19
+
30∑
i=15
I(LOS >= i)98.19 ∗ .95 +
180∑
i=31
I(LOS >= i)98.19 ∗ .86 +
Amendment︷ ︸︸ ︷
LOS∑
i=181
I(LOS >= i)98.19 ∗ .75
+
LOS∑
i=LOS−6
I(i > 0) ∗ 98.19 ∗ 1.15 +
LOS∑
i=1
44.72
(3)
Since this change does not occur until day 180, the two policies equate in total payments on the
same day, 131. Divergence of the two policies begins during the 181st day of care, at which point
the policy has an average daily rate of 138.75 compared to the current rate of 142.91. This is made
clear in figures 3 & 4 below.
[Figure 3 – Presents total CMS payments for a patient with each LOS. Calculations by author.]
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[Figure 4 – Presents avg per-diem CMS payments for a patient by LOS. Calculations by author.]
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The CMS guidelines for MHB eligibility require a patient to have a life expectancy of six months
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or less. Reducing the payment rate for patients with stays of 180 days reduces the incentive for
hospices to game the system by readmitting ineligible patients. Most important is that this change
is budget neutral. With no response, Medicare’s total payments in the proposed system will be
$757,000,000, 1% lower than current payments. This policy, and the original policy, is valuable
for an eligibility standard of 131 days (or slightly more than four months) or less, at which point
hospices will prefer the current system. CMS must remember that most patients in hospice care
save money, compared to curative treatments.
5.2 Two-part Pricing
Two-part pricing is an alternative solution to the non-linear hospice patient cost problem. The
use of a two-part pricing system involves a one-time payment, often referred to as a “right to
purchase” (Feldstein, 1972), and a constant marginal price per unit purchased. The price per
unit component already exists in hospice as the per-diem reimbursement rate. Using the one time
payment to capture outlier patient costs is a logical progression from the single price payment
system.
The MedPAC proposal increases payments for the first and last seven days of care to capture
the non-linear patient costs. In this model we require the upfront, lump sum, payment to account
for both of these costs. To construct the lump sum payments we use MedPAC estimates of the
cost of the first, and last, 7 days of a patient’s hospice stay, during which labor costs are increased
by approximately 115%. This suggests a lump sum payment of $1,620.93 per patient. The per
diem rate is set to equalize the two policies at the 180th day of care to insure there are no service
disruptions for MHB eligible patients. This requirement is achieved with a per diem rate of $133.91,
93.7% of the current rate of $142.91. Figure 5 & 6 shows how the total payment and average per
diem amounts compare to the current policy:
[Figure 5 – Above: Presents total CMS payments for a patient with each LOS. Calculations by
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author.]
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[Figure 6 – Presents avg per-diem CMS payments for a patient by LOS. Calculations by author.]
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By design, the two-part and the current payment systems pay equal total reimbursements on
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the 180th day of care. This insures that no MHB eligible hospice patient is less profitable in the
new system. However, as seen at the right edge in the second graph of figure 4, recertified patients
will provide lower average per diem revenue as the lump sum payment is averaged out. This results
in a budget reduction in CA since total Medicare expenditures of $552,000,000 are 6.3% lower than
under the current system. This result stems from the fact that roughly 8% of patients have hospice
stays longer than 180 days. Medicare savings will likely decline over time as hospice’s tighten their
existing admission and recertification procedures in response to the policy change.
Both proposals, while focusing on diminishing incentives for lax admissions and recertification
procedures, are reducing the incentives for patients to be referred to hospice earlier. This is an
important consideration for Medicare because of evidence that the average hospice patient spends
less than if they receive curative treatments. This “tug-of-war” between reducing perverse incentives
and increasing appropriate hospice use is inherent in every proposal which reduces the financial
benefit of long-stay patients. In this case, the two-part proposal does not reduce the per-diem
rate by LOS, likely resulting in more patients entering hospice at the appropriate time than in a
multi-tiered system.
6 Conclusion
The multi-tiered payment discussed in section 5.1 shifts the distribution of payments by LOS
towards zero, making low LOS patients more financially attractive than in the current system.
Specifically, the proposal increases total payments to hospices with average patient LOS less than
131 days. The two-part pricing proposal discussed in section 5.2 captures the non-linear patient
costs in a lump-sum payment. This policy is an improvement upon the multi-tiered system in
two ways: it assures that all patients with life expectancies of six months or less are at least as
profitable as the current system, and it reduces Medicare expenditures further. Both policies reduce
the financial benefit of high LOS patients, which will lead to a reduction in average LOS, and will
diminish Medicare savings under both plans. Both policies are feasible; however, a two-part pricing
system is simpler for all parties to understand, adjust and implement.
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Abstract
Though an accurate definition of an economic market is important for any study of industry,
there is no rule governing what exactly constitutes a market. To define a market we must ask the
question “between which products do consumers substitute,” knowing that the answer to this
question will depend on how “close” products are to one another in product space, as well as how
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choice model of air travel demand that uses known information about the locations of products
and consumers, which allows us to study substitution patterns among air travel products at
different airports. We evaluate the commonly used city-pair and airport-pair definitions of a
market for air travel, and conclude that a city-pair is the appropriate definition. We also employ
the Hypothetical Monopolist test for antitrust market definition, as defined by the Department
of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, and conclude that the relevant geographic market for
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1 Introduction
It is surprisingly rare in the airline economics literature to allow for imperfect substitu-
tion between airports. More commonly, airports within the same metropolitan area are
treated as identical or as completely separate markets. - Peters (2006)
In 1979 Jim Wright, a congressman from Fort Worth, Texas, sponsored an amendment to the In-
ternational Air Transportation Act that banned interstate travel out of Dallas Love Airport (DAL).
Carriers that had previously offered service out of DAL had signed an agreement to relocate to the
newly constructed Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) in 1974, and were concerned
about competition from Southwest Airlines out of DAL. Southwest Airlines had not signed and,
as the US Supreme Court had ruled in 1973, was not bound by the agreement signed by the other
carriers. The Wright Amendment banned service on large and mid-size aircraft from DAL to des-
tinations outside of Texas and its four neighboring states (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, and
Oklahoma). It would appear that the concerns of the DFW carriers were well-founded: Southwest
did a brisk business, dominating service to many non-Wright-restricted destinations on the way to
becoming, by some metrics, the largest and most successful domestic airline.1 Flights out of DAL
proved to be good substitutes for flights out of DFW in the eyes of consumers.
Despite a wealth of empirical literature on the US airline industry, almost no attention has
been paid to the degree to which geographically differentiated air travel products compete with
each other. Researchers typically choose between two competing definitions of a market for airline
travel: a city-pair or an airport-pair.2 Of course, neither definition can be completely correct.
To the degree that air travel products at different locations exist in the same market, they must
represent imperfect substitutes. The degree of substitutability will depend both on the physical
distance between airports and on the spatial distribution of potential customers around them. A
model that wants to take substitution patterns between airports seriously, then, must incorporate
data on locations of consumers and products.
1According to the Department of Transportation, Southwest was the domestic leader with 13.9% of all passenger-
miles flown in the year from July 2009 through June 2010.
2Under a city-pair definition, a market is composed of all air travel products with the same origin and destination
cities, so flights out of DAL and DFW would exist in the same market. Under an airport-pair definition, a market
is composed of all air travel products with the same origin and destination airports, so that flights out of DAL and
DFW would exist in completely separate markets.
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A handful of authors have studied issues of geographic competition and airport choice. Morri-
son (2001) provides econometric evidence of $3 Billion in consumer savings in 1998 due to lower
prices on routes with which Southwest competed adjacently (via geographically close airports).3
However, Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) find no evidence of such geographically adjacent compe-
tition. Authors that have studied the issue of airport choice directly have generally used airline
passenger survey data collected in 1995 by the Metropolitan Transportation Commission in the
San Francisco Bay Area (for example Basar and Bhat (2004), Hess and Polak (2005, 2006) and
Ishii, Jun and Van Dender (2009)). Their general findings are that commuting time to the airport
matters to travelers, and that passengers have substantial heterogeneity in their tastes for flight
characteristics such as price and origin airport (for example business travelers care less about price
and more about commuting time to the airport than do leisure travelers). These studies show that
customers simultaneously consider flights out of different airports when making a flight choice, and
thus that such flights do compete with one another other.
We estimate a differentiated product, discrete choice, model of air travel demand with unob-
served consumer heterogeneity, following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (BLP).4 In our model,
products are differentiated by geography (among other characteristics) and consumers are located
around and between these products according to the population distribution. Estimates reveal
substitution patterns between air travel products at different airports. We apply these estimates
to questions of geographic market definition in the airline industry, and evaluate the city-pair and
airport-pair market definitions in the context of an antitrust market as defined by the US Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), as well as an economic market in
the sense usually used by researchers and industry observers. The method is easily replicable and
widely applicable, and can be used to study questions of market definition in other industries.
In the next section we discuss the question of market definition, and review the DOJ method
for delineating antitrust markets. Sections 3 and 4 present our econometric model and our data,
respectively. Section 5 contains results of the demand estimation, which are used to compute
counterfactual scenarios in sections 6 and 7. Section 8 concludes.
3It should be noted that Morrison’s research was undertaken on behalf of Southwest.
4Methodologically, our econometric model is also close to those of Davis (2006), McManus (2007) and Thomadsen
(2005), who also use information about the spatial distribution of consumers to estimate a travel cost parameter.
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2 Geographic market definition
How to define a market is a classic question dating back at least as far as Alfred Marshall (1920),
who described a market as “the whole of any region in which buyers and sellers are in such free
intercourse with one another that the prices of the same goods tend to equality easily and quickly.”
We will follow Scheffman and Spiller (1987) by referring to this notion of a market as an “economic
market.” They further interpret this definition of an economic market as “that area and set
of products within which prices are linked to one another by supply- or demand-side arbitrage
and in which those prices can be treated independently of prices of goods not in the market.”
In a differentiated products industry such as the US airline industry, prices will never tend to
equality. So in defining an economic market we should be looking for the set of products such that
a hypothetical firm setting a price for one of those products would not be worried about competition
from any product outside of that set. Naturally this will be the set of products that consumers find
to be reasonably substitutable for one another. This is the market definition which comes closest
to how economists and industry members generally use the term “market.”
The DOJ definition of an antitrust market can be found in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.5
Specifically, a relevant market for merger analysis is defined as a set of products over which a single
firm could exercise market power. The test performed by the DOJ in conducting analyses of the
potential competitive effects of mergers is frequently referred to as the “hypothetical monopolist”
(HM) test, and involves defining a small set of products over which the HM is given pricing power.
If the HM “likely would impose at least a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price
(“SSNIP”) on at least one product in the market”, then that set of products constitutes the relevant
market. The benchmark SSNIP is 5%, although the Guidelines note that the DOJ may use an
increase of more or less than this amount depending on “the nature of the industry and the merging
firms’ positions in it.”
The process of defining a geographic market using the HM test is then quite simple; begin with
all products at a single location (in our case, all products at a single airport) and ask whether or not
the HM would profitably impose a SSNIP. If so then the relevant market only includes products at
5Technically, the definition can be attributed to both the DOJ and the FTC as they coauthor the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines. Throughout the paper, we will use the term DOJ to mean “antitrust authority”, a term meant
to include both the DOJ and the FTC.
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a single location; if not then include products at the next closest geographic location and perform
the test again.
This test naturally leads to a more narrow definition of a market. Katz and Shapiro (2003) show
that the HM test can lead to very narrowly defined markets, in particular when margins are high
(i.e., when products are very differentiated). While such a market definition may seem appropriate
given that the goal of antitrust analysis is to identify potential anticompetitive effect, courts have
preferred to define a market more broadly, and more intuitively, as the set of products between
which consumers substitute. For example, Farrell and Shapiro (2008) note that when Whole Foods
proposed to buy Wild Oats in 2007 the FTC argued that the two grocers competed in a market
for natural or organic supermarkets separate from such grocery chains as Krogers or Safeway. The
District Court of Appeals rejected this market definition, in part because of evidence that Whole
Foods and Wild Oats customers also shop at other supermarkets.
Our study is not about mergers, except to the extent that our analysis informs questions of
geographic market definition that might occur during merger analysis. However, the method for
delineating a product and geographic market outlined in the Merger Guidelines represents the only
formal exposition of the topic. Thus, we will apply the HM test to the markets in our sample, and
also analyze substitution patterns between airports when individual prices of popular products are
raised. We find that the relevant geographic market for merger analysis defined by the HM test
is frequently an airport-pair definition, while the more intuitive definition as the set of products
between which consumers substitute (and thus the definition likely to be preferred by courts in
a merger case) is the city-pair definition. We also conduct merger simulations using each type of
market definition, and find that both definitions underpredict price increases as compared to our
model in which different airports represent imperfect substitutes for one another.
3 A discrete choice model of air travel demand
We employ a discrete choice model of air travel demand in which consumers in each market are
assumed to choose between a menu of air travel products which can include not purchasing any
product at all. Demand parameters from the estimated model, along with an assumption on firm
behavior, are used to infer marginal costs. These marginal costs are used to estimate pricing
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behavior under different counterfactual scenarios.
3.1 Demand
Consumers i = 1, . . .Mt (where Mt is the size of market t), in markets t = 1, . . . T choose between
consuming exactly one unit of j = 1, . . . Jt products or an outside good, the mean utility of which
is normalized to zero. Consumer i’s utility from consuming product j in market t is given by
uijt = xjtβi − αipjt − γd(ℓit, ljt) + ξjt + ǫijt. (1)
The familiar arguments of the utility function are xjt, a 1× k vector of observed characteristics of
product j, pjt, the observed price of product j, and the two error terms ξjt and ǫijt. The former is a
product-specific error that is unobservable to the econometrician but observable to consumers and
firms, and is thus likely to be correlated with the price of product j. The latter is an individual-
and product-specific idiosyncratic error that is assumed to be mean zero and distributed Type-I
extreme value. The remaining argument d(ℓit, ljt) is also individual- and product-specific; it is the
distance between the location of consumer i, ℓit, and the location of product j, ljt. The parameter
γ is then a transport cost, equal to the disutility incurred from traveling both to and from the
airport. The parameters αi and βi also vary by consumer. Individuals share a mean α and β, and
their own idiosyncratic variations around these mean parameters are explained by their income, for
example αi = α+ Iiπp.
6 These income interactions are meant to capture heterogeneity in taste for
observed product characteristics.
The set of consumers in market t who choose each product is defined as Ajt(p, x, ξ) =
{ℓit, Iit, ǫit|uijt ≥ uimt, ∀m = 0, 1, . . . Jt}. The market share of good j is then
sjt(pt, xt, ξt) =
∫
Ajt
dF (ℓt, It, ǫt) =
∫
Ajt
dF (ℓt, It)dF (ǫt) (2)
where the last equality follows from the fact that the errors are assumed to be identically and
independently distributed.
6In the actual estimation we follow the usual procedure and take the log of income and then use differences to
multiply the parameter. So, for individual i, Ii represents the difference between i’s logged income and the mean
logged income level in our sample.
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3.2 Supply
Given the demand model specified above, an assumption on firm conduct is necessary to identify
marginal costs. We follow Peters (2006), Gayle (2007) and Berry and Jia (2010) in assuming that
airlines play a static Bertrand pricing game.7 The supply side methodology presented below is
explained in more detail by Nevo (2000a) and Peters (2006).
Demand for product j in market t is given by
qjt = sjt(pt, xt, lt, It, ξt)Mt (3)
Let f denote a particular airline, and let Ff denote the set of products owned by airline f . The
profits of airline f can then be expressed as
∏
f
=
∑
j∈Ff
(pj −mcj)qj − Cf (4)
where mcj and Cf denote the marginal cost of producing product j and the fixed cost incurred by
firm f , respectively.
The standard first order conditions which result from the Bertrand pricing assumption are used
to recover estimates of marginal costs. These marginal costs can then be fed back into the profit
function in order to estimate firm profits for any combination of market prices. The DOJ HM
test involves changing Ff so that all products at an individual airport are owned by the same
firm. Under a merger, Ff will change as well, and the first order conditions can be used to solve
for post-merger prices under the assumption that marginal costs do not change as a result of the
merger.
7Peters (2006) conducts merger simulations using this methodology, and then compares their predictions with ex-
post outcomes in markets for air travel. He finds that merger simulations perform poorly, mostly because of supply-side
changes as the result of mergers that are not accounted for by the typical Bertrand-Nash merger simulation model.
Gayle (2007), on the other hand, estimates marginal costs, then uses them to predict prices using the Bertand-Nash
assumption. He finds the predicted prices to be highly correlated with actual observed prices in his model. A
reasonable interpretation of the apparently incompatible results is that Bertrand-Nash is a good approximation to
how airlines actually compete in the short run, while in the long-run mergers frequently result in larger supply side
changes, for example in the structure of an airline’s route network. Such changes would lead to the large divergence
between the predicted effects of a merger and the actual competitive effects of a merger that Peters (2006) documents.
Benkard, Bodoh-Creed and Lazarev (2010) estimate a dynamic merger simulations model using airline data in order
to more accurately predict the supply side changes documented by Peters (2006).
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3.3 Estimation
Using the familiar logit formula for the idiosyncratic error and the population distribution of indi-
viduals in and around markets, the model can be estimated by matching the market shares predicted
by the model to those we observe in the data as closely as possible. The estimation method closely
follows Berry (1994), BLP, and Nevo (2000b). Specifically, we use simulated demographic draws in
order to numerically approximate the integral in (2).8 Drawing ns simulated individuals from the
joint demographic distribution of income and location, the estimated market share of product j in
market t is
sjt(pt, xt, lt, It, ξt) =
1
ns
ns∑
i=1
exjtβi−αipjt−γdijt+ξjt
1 +
∑Jt
m=1 e
xmtβi−αipmt−γdimt+ξmt
. (5)
Solving (5) for the unobserved product-specific error leaves ξ as an econometric error, expressed
as a function of observed and predicted shares, which can be interacted with a set of exogenous
instruments in a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. Calculating ξ for given
parameter values, however, is no simple task and must be done by inverting the market share
equation via contraction mapping.9,10
3.4 Identification
Nevo (2000b) discusses identification of BLP-style demand models using demographic data, while
Berry and Haile (2009) show conditions for fully nonparametric identification of demand. In short,
the income interactions in our model are theoretically identified by observing choices by individuals
in different markets with different income distributions.
The parameter γ, on the other hand, would be quite well identified even with data on only
one market, provided that market is observed over several periods with variations in the choices
available at different locations. In the context of the airline industry, it is also well identified with
8The demographic draws are necessary in the absence of data matching individuals to purchases.
9The contraction mapping is necessary because of the individual-specific nature of the utility function. See Berry
(1994) for examples of simpler models in which the inversion can be done more easily, and BLP for a proof of
convergence of the contraction mapping.
10Dube´, Fox and Su (2009) argue that the BLP contraction mapping is unlikely to find a global minimum when
tolerance levels are too loose, and present an alternative method for estimating random coefficient mixed logit models
of demand that outperforms the BLP method in Monte Carlo simulations. While we plan to estimate the model
using their method, for now we solve this problem by using stringent tolerance levels.
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data on several air travel markets departing from the same origin region (the same set of origin
airports), as long as there is variation across destinations in the characteristics of products available
at the different origin airports.
4 Data and sample selection
The main source of data used in this study is the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Databank
1B (DB1B), which is a 10% sample of ticketed passengers in a quarter. Observed flight characteris-
tics include, but are not limited to, the transaction price, the airline that sold the ticket, all airports
visited on an itinerary, whether or not the itinerary was booked as a round trip, the distance be-
tween the origin and the destination airport and the actual distance flown by the passenger. A
second source of air travel data is the Air Carrier Statistics database, containing air traffic informa-
tion in the form of databank T-100, a comprehensive aggregation of non-stop segment data from
all commercial air carriers in the US. These data are used to define prices and characteristics of
air travel products, and to construct instruments for price. Both of these databanks are publicly
available from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS).11
Market shares are calculated by assuming the market size Mt is proportional to the geometric
mean of the populations of the origin and destination cities. Data on Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA) population are downloaded from the U.S. Census Bureau website.12 Origin and destination
airports were matched to the appropriate MSA by hand, and these populations used to define
market size.13
The demographic data used to draw simulated consumers are also obtained from the US Census
Bureau. The Census 2000 Summary File 1 contains comprehensive information on population by
income for all zip code tabulation areas (ZCTAs) within the U.S.14 Individuals were drawn from the
areas surrounding the origin airports according to the geographic distribution of the population,
11As of October, 2010 the data can be accessed easily from http://www.transtats.bts.gov.
12As of October, 2010 the url is http://www.census.gov/popest/metro/CBSA-est2006-annual.html.
13Nevo (2000b) has a short discussion of how to choose Mt. Airline researchers have assumed Mt proportional
to either origin MSA, or the geometric mean of origin and destination MSA. We estimated our model under both
assumptions using different factors of proportionality, and found that parameter values did not depend on the chosen
value ofMt in any major way. The choice ofMt does, however, affect outside good share, and thus affects substitution
patterns between air travel products and the outside good.
14A ZCTA is a statistical entity developed by the U.S. Census Bureau for the purposes of aggregating data from
the 2000 census. ZCTAs correspond to and approximate, but are not necessarilly the same as, postal zip codes. As
of October, 2010, more information on ZCTAs can be found at http://www.census.gov/geo/ZCTA/zcta.html
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and then drawn from income brackets according to the income distribution within that ZCTA.
4.1 Sample selection
Because of the availability of good nationwide demographic data due to the 2000 Census, and in
order to avoid the shift in demand that immediately followed the attacks of September 11th, 2001,
we have restricted our sample to all four quarters of the year 2000.
We also restrict our sample to itineraries for which the consumer’s potential choice set is obvious.
For example, it is simple to define the choice set for a consumer in the Houston, Texas area. That
consumer can fly out of IAH or HOU, but will not drive to Austin or San Antonio, the locations of
the other nearest major airports. On the other hand, it would be very difficult to define a single
choice set for consumers drawn from the area in and around the New York City tri-state area,
which also contains portions of Connecticut and New Jersey. These consumers have many airport
choices, and consumers drawn from the Connecticut side of the city would have different, although
not mutually exclusive, choice sets from consumers drawn from the New Jersey side. Thus, our
sample includes itineraries originating in the Houston area but not those originating from airports
in and around the tri-state area. Similarly, there are some destinations which consumers may
plausibly be able to reach by landing at more than one airport. We do not use routes to such
airports in our sample, due again to concerns about accurately defining the consumer’s choice set.
Table 1 presents a list of origin airports used in the study, while table 2 presents a list of destination
airports used in the study. A more detailed description of how we chose which origin airports to
include in the study is presented in the appendix.
Table 1: Origin airports in sample
Origin region Name Code
Colorado Colorado Springs COS
Colorado Denver International DEN
Dallas Dallas-Forth Worth International DFW
Dallas Dallas Love Field DAL
Houston William P. Hobby HOU
Houston George Bush Intercontinental IAH
SE Florida Miami International MIA
SE Florida Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International FLL
SE Florida Palm Beach International PBI
N California San Francisco International SFO
N California Oakland International OAK
N California Norman Y. Mineta San Jose International SJC
N California Sacramento International SMF
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In the end, we include flights from 5 multi-airport origin regions. The destinations included
in the sample are, for each origin region, the 10 most popular destination airports, excluding
destinations containing more than one airport.
At this point, a word about how we are defining a market in our data is warranted. The careful
reader has noticed that the estimation procedure requires us to define a market, in the sense that
we must define the choice set for each simulated consumer and the market shares that are interacted
in the GMM estimator. However, the question of market definition is central to our study. The
correct definition of a market or choice set is exactly what we are after. Thus, we define the market
very broadly, and then let the data tell us to what extent products at different locations exist in
the same market.
For the purposes of estimation, we define a market as a unique combination of origin region,
destination airport and quarter. Thus there will be 40 markets with the same origin region, or the
same set of origin airports. Lists of the origin and destination airports used in our sample can be
found in tables 1 and 2.
Table 2: Destination airports in the sample
Location Name Code
College Park, GA Hartsfield - Jackson Atlanta International ATL
Austin, TX Austin Bergstrom International AUS
Windsor Locks, CT Bradley International BDL
Boston, MA Boston Logan International BOS
Denver, Colorado Denver International DEN
Fort Worth, TX Dallas / Fort Worth International DFW
Detroit, MI Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County DTW
Jacksonville, FL Jacksonville International JAX
Las Vegas, NV Las Vegas McCarran International LAS
Kansas City, MO Kansas City International MCI
Orlando, FL Orlando International MCO
Minneapolis, MN Minneapolis - St. Paul International MSP
Kenner, LA Louis Armstrong New Orleans International MSY
Portland, OR Portland International PDX
Philadelphia, PA Philadelphia International PHL
Phoenix, AZ Phoenix Sky Harbor International PHX
San Diego, CA San Diego International SAN
San Antonio, TX San Antonio International SAT
Seattle, WA Seattle - Tacoma International SEA
Salt Lake City, UT Salt Lake City International SLC
Tulsa, OK Tulsa International TUL
72
4.2 Construction of the data set
We consider only round-trip travel, and thus drop any itinerary in the DB1B that was not booked
as a round-trip. We also drop itineraries involving more than 2 intermediate stops, itineraries
with fares less than $20 or more than $9,999, and itineraries with fares deemed not to be credible,
according to a credibility indicator provided in the data by the DOT. An air travel product within
a market is defined as a unique combination of airline and travel itinerary.
The treatment of prices in air travel markets is complicated by the fact that a given air-
line/itinerary combination may be purchased multiple times at multiple prices by different con-
sumers throughout a quarter. We follow Peters (2006) and Gayle (2007), as well as a host of other
airline researchers, by averaging prices and assigning each product this single, averaged price.15,16
An observation in our data is then a product in a market, a unique combination of airline,
travel itinerary and quarter. In addition to price, observed characteristics of these products include
the number of stops in the itinerary, the number of destinations served by the carrier out of the
origin airport, and the distance between origin and destination airport. Summary statistics for
these variables, as well as product shares, are presented in table 3.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Median Mean Std
Share 9.12× 10−5 2.51× 10−3 1.09× 10−2
Price (2000 $100) 3.21 4.21 3.44
Stops 2.00 1.51 0.67
Destinations Served 11.00 17.29 18.28
Flight Distance (1K miles) 2.47 2.86 1.42
In estimating the model we include a set of air carrier, region and quarter dummy variables.
These variables can be thought of as controlling for any firm-, region- or time- specific portion of
15Other authors have simply defined a product to be a unique combination of fare, airline and itinerary (Berry,
Carnall & Spiller, 2006) or placed different products into different fare “bins” depending on the fare observed in
DB1B (so that a $325 ticket and a $328 ticket would be treated as the same product with the same price, but a $325
ticket and a $500 ticket would be treated as different products with different prices) (Berry & Jia, 2009).
16Much of the variation in prices can be explained by the fare class of the ticket (e.g. business class or coach),
restrictions on the ticket (such as rules governing whether the ticket may be refunded or the trip rescheduled), the
date of purchase or the dates of travel (prices typically rise steeply less than two weeks before the flight, and trips
that span at least one weekend are typically cheaper than trips that do not). The DB1B does include data on fare
class, but it is generally regarded as unreliable because different carriers classify fares in different ways (for example,
Southwest assigns the same fare class to all tickets). The DB1B does not include data on ticket restrictions, date
of purchase or dates of travel. While these unobserved variables affect individual prices, we are implicitly assuming
that they do not have a great effect on average prices, as all fare classes, restrictions and dates of travel are available
for any product in any market. In any case, characteristics that are unobserved in the data make it very important
that we take seriously the ξ term in the utility function, and instrument price effectively in estimation.
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ξjt. Also subsumed into each region-specific constant term will be any regional difference in a fixed
travel cost. Numbers of sample observations by carrier and region are presented in table 4. Carrier
codes used in the DB1B data are also included in the table, as we will use them to refer to airlines
later in the paper.
We also construct instruments for the potentially endogenous price variable using the DB1B
and T-100 datasets. These instrumental variables are assumed to be correlated with the price pj
an airline charges for a given product j, but not with the unobservable ξj . Instruments include
average prices charged by an airline on all routes leaving from other origin airports, the number of
carriers serving a route and within a market, the number of own and rival products on a route and
within a market, the number of own and rival products with the equivalent number of intermediate
stops on a route and within a market, the percent and number of rival routes that are nonstop, and
the deviation of itinerary distance from the average of competing products offered by other airlines
on a route and within a market.
Table 4: Products in sample by airline and region
Airline Code Colorado Dallas Florida Houston Norcal Total
American AA 119 138 297 81 535 1,170
Alaska AS 0 0 0 0 83 83
Continental CO 102 86 219 123 134 664
Delta DL 409 271 614 62 408 1,764
Frontier F9 43 22 0 0 30 95
AirTran FL 0 33 60 20 0 113
America West HP 101 33 64 31 424 653
Midway JI 0 0 34 0 2 36
National N7 0 4 4 0 20 28
Vanguard NJ 42 13 0 0 0 55
Spirit NK 0 0 7 0 0 7
Northwest NW 125 52 142 53 152 524
Sun Country SY 0 4 0 0 2 6
Transworld TW 49 29 61 22 63 224
ATA TZ 20 7 24 0 8 59
United UA 372 73 167 33 1,159 1,804
US Airways US 87 59 851 47 126 1,170
Southwest WN 0 204 181 207 826 1,418
Midwest YX 4 1 0 0 3 8
Total 1,473 1,029 2,725 679 3,975 9,881
We then draw ns = 1, 000 individuals from ZCTAs within 80 miles of at least one of the origin
airports in a market. We assign each individual an income bracket according to the population
distribution of incomes within that ZCTA, and assign that individual an income level equal to the
midpoint of that bracket and a location at the centroid of that ZCTA. We use these simulated
74
individuals to compute the market shares in (5) for different parameter values in the estimation
procedure.
5 Results
The parameters from the estimated demand model are presented in table 5 below. Fare, number
of intermediate stops on an itinerary and the cost incurred traveling to the airport all enter utility
negatively as expected. Flight distance enters utility positively (flights are more attractive relative
to the outside good when the destination is further away). The mean utility parameter for the
number of destinations an airline serves out of an origin airport is small and not significantly
different from zero (in a model without income interactions it is positive and significant).
The positive interaction between itinerary stops and income level, though not significantly
different from zero, tells us that higher income travelers incur greater disutility from connecting
flights, and thus are more likely to purchase nonstop flights for a given price level than are lower
income travelers. This is consistent with intuition that wealthier travelers are more willing to
pay for a high quality product, and with the idea that business travelers are more likely to prefer
nonstop flights because of a high opportunity cost of their time. The positive sign on the interaction
with price conforms to intuition that wealthier travelers incur less disutility from price. We have
no prior expectation as to what the sign of the interaction between income and destinations served
or flight distance should be.
Table 5: Results from Demand Model
Variable Mean Income interaction
Constant -0.2297 -
(1.0763) -
Price -0.7629 0.2334
(0.0950) (0.1497)
Stops -1.3281 -0.2226
(0.4221) (0.2729)
Destinations -0.0285 -0.0670
(0.0295) (0.0136)
Flight distance 0.1412 -0.1214
(0.1551) (0.3074)
Travel cost (γ) -1.4552
(0.3551)
Quarter, region and airline fixed effects were estimated but are
not reported (see appendix for full estimation results). Stan-
dard errors are robust to general forms of heteroskedasticity.
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At first glance, the travel cost parameter γ seems high, implying that consumers would, on
average, be willing to pay almost $100 in order to avoid an extra 10 miles of commuting to and from
an airport. Most likely, this travel cost is not linear, though attempts to estimate a quadratic cost or
a cost which depends in some way on traffic congestion around an airport have not been fruitful (any
region-specific fixed travel cost has been subsumed into the estimated dummy variables). Perhaps
more importantly, γ represents something of a reduced form travel cost. In 2000, comparing flights
online via search engine was a relatively new phenomenon, and many customers booked travel
directly with airlines or travel agents, which may have made shopping around more difficult.17
In any case, γ represents some degree of substitutability between geographically differentiated
products. To the degree that we have failed to exactly estimate the true parameter(s), we are
probably overestimating travel cost and thus underestimating the degree of substitutabililty between
airports.
In general, the estimated parameters conform to our expectations, based on both intuition and
results reported in other discrete choice studies of air travel demand. What makes the results
interesting is that they can be used to analyze substitution patterns between air travel products
originating at different airports. With this motivation in mind, a representative own- and cross-
price elasticity matrix is presented in table 6. Elasticities reported are those for nonstop flights
from Southeastern Florida to ATL (the most popular destination) in the third quarter of 2000
(substitution towards connecting flights and the outside good is also represented by the bottom
four rows).
The Southeast Florida region contains three airports scattered along the densely populated
Atlantic coastline. The Southernmost is MIA within the city of Miami, with Fort Lauderdale’s
FLL 21 miles to the north. Another 42 miles to the north is PBI in Palm Beach, Florida. For
a large number of consumers MIA and FLL are close substitutes, while for a smaller number of
consumers FLL and PBI are close substitutes (the area between MIA and FLL is much more densely
populated than that between FLL and PBI).
The substitution patterns revealed by the elasticity matrix suggest that there is not substantial
17Berry & Jia (2010) find that between 1999 and 2006, traveler preferences for direct flights increased, and travelers
became more price sensitive. Much of this change can probably be attributed to the increased ease with which
customers can shop around for the best flight. By the same token, if we were to estimate our model on 2010 data,
we would expect the travel cost to be lower.
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Table 6: Elasticity matrix for nonstop flights to ATL, SE Florida region, Q3.
FL FLL AA MIA DL FLL UA MIA DL MIA FL MIA DL PBI
FL FLL -1.540 0.027 0.016 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.000
AA MIA 0.003 -1.994 0.015 0.052 0.015 0.008 0.000
DL FLL 0.013 0.105 -2.437 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.000
UA MIA 0.003 0.252 0.007 -2.204 0.015 0.011 0.000
DL MIA 0.003 0.111 0.004 0.023 -1.852 0.012 0.000
FL MIA 0.003 0.074 0.003 0.020 0.014 -1.595 0.000
DL PBI 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.0000 -2.758
Conn MIA 0.003 0.158 0.005 0.025 0.014 0.012 0.000
Conn FLL 0.013 0.104 0.039 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.000
Conn PBI 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.039
Outside 0.004 0.043 0.007 0.008 0.043 0.004 0.002
Each entry is
∂sj
∂pi
pi
sj
, where i indexes column and j indexes row. So, for example, the
second column indicates percent changes in the market shares of all products when there
is a percentage point increase in the price of an AA flight from MIA to ATL.
substitution between PBI and the other two airports down the coast, while consumers do readily
substitute between MIA and FLL. For example, a one percent increase in the price of a direct flight
on American Airlines out of MIA leads to similar percent increases in the shares of Delta’s direct
flights out of MIA and FLL. This is suggestive of the idea that consumers find flights out of MIA
and FLL to be substitutable, and that a city-pair market definition in which FLL and MIA are
grouped together into one market may be more correct than an airport-pair definition in which it
is assumed that no consumer simultaneously considers flights out of the two.
6 Market Definition
The main purpose of estimating the model of demand is to rigorously define geographic markets
for airline travel. We first turn to the DOJ’s HM test and conduct a related “critical loss analysis”
that is also described in the Merger Guidelines. We then conduct a related experiment in which
we raise the prices of individual products in representative markets in our sample and ask where
consumers substitute in response. When substitution between similar products at different airports
is stronger than substitution between dissimilar products at the same airport, we conclude that
the two airports exist in the same economic market. We find that an airport-pair definition of an
antitrust market is usually the correct one, though this conclusion depends critically on the level
of competition at individual airports. On the other hand, we conclude that a city-pair definition of
an economic market is much more appropriate, as consumers willingly substitute between airports
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within the same metropolitan area.
6.1 Antitrust Markets
The HM test for geographic market definition is simple to implement in markets for airline travel as
all products are sold at one of only a few discrete (and more or less exogenously imposed) locations.
For each airport in our sample, we assign ownership of all products to a single firm, and solve the
Bertrand first order conditions for the optimal prices, holding prices at other nearby airports fixed.
This is exactly the method outlined in the Merger Guidelines.
Table 7: Hypothetical monopolist test
Route Origin
Largest price increase Carriers on route
All products Nonstop Total Nonstop
Colorado to LAS
COS 10.69 % 1.01 % 4 1
DEN 20.26 % 13.13 % 5 3
Colorado to DFW
COS 5.10 % 1.92 % 5 2
DEN 55.42 % 8.03 % 7 4
Colorado to PHX
COS 0.84 % 0.23 % 3 1
DEN 4.59 % 4.59 % 4 3
Dallas to SAT
DAL 0 % 0 % 1 1
DFW 48.85 % 48.85 % 3 2
Dallas to AUS
DAL 0 % 0 % 1 1
DFW 47.94 % 47.94 % 3 2
Dallas to MSY
DAL 0 % 0 % 1 1
DFW 36.79 % 36.79 % 4 2
Houston to MSY
HOU 0 % 0 % 1 1
IAH 1.01 % 0.00 % 2 1
Houston to ATL
HOU 1.80 % 1.11 % 2 2
IAH 16.89 % 2.16 % 7 2
Houston to LAS
HOU 3.18 % 0.06 % 3 1
IAH 5.70 % 2.92 % 7 2
SE Florida to ATL
FLL 3.61 % 0.80 % 4 2
MIA 9.27 % 6.21 % 5 4
PBI 0.53 % -0.03 % 2 1
SE Florida to BOS
FLL 6.41 % 5.22 % 7 4
MIA 16.26 % 1.13 % 7 1
PBI 6.31 % 3.21 % 6 2
SE Florida to LAS
FLL 7.41 % 4.00 % 9 3
MIA 9.66 % 3.04 % 9 2
PBI 3.46 % - % 6 0
N California to LAS
OAK 11.30 % 11.30 % 4 3
SFO 41.34 % 21.61 % 6 5
SJC 28.76 % 27.96 % 4 3
SMF 10.31 % 8.43 % 3 2
N California to SAN
OAK 48.93 % 19.01 % 3 2
SFO 37.19 % 11.78 % 3 2
SJC 38.31 % 19.08 % 4 2
SMF 13.72 % 13.72 % 2 2
N California to SEA
OAK 5.75 % 5.75 % 2 2
SFO 23.83 % 3.19 % 3 2
SJC 26.60 % 19.38 % 5 3
SMF 2.04 % 2.04 % 3 2
Predicted price increases are for the 3rd quarter of 2000.
We perform the HM test for the three most popular destinations from each of the five origin
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regions in our sample. Results are reported in table 7. Because the demand model reveals a
substantial preference for nonstop flights, and because most major routes are characterized by a
small number of airlines offering nonstop service alongside a multitude of less attractive connecting
options, the relevant product market for antitrust analysis usually consists of only nonstop flights.18
We report both the largest predicted price increase for all air travel products at an airport, and
the largest predicted price increase for nonstop products. Because there is substantial variation in
the competitive environment at the airports, we also report the number of carriers active on the
route, and the number offering nonstop flights on the route.
Results of the test suggest that for many of the routes in our sample, an antitrust market would
not include competition from another airport, no matter how geographically close. For example, a
hypothetical monopolist at OAK or SJC would profitably impose at least a 5% price increase on
at least one product of each type despite the presence of competition out of SFO only 11 and 30
miles away, respectively, from each airport. In general, the 4 airports in Northern California are
sufficiently competitive that a merger of firms at that airport would allow for an increased exercise
of market power despite the presence of geographic competition.
The three destinations considered from the Dallas region are not nearly as competitive.19 In each
case, Southwest Airlines is the only carrier operating out of DAL, while American and Delta Airlines
offer direct service from their hubs at DFW. As travel to each destination is a 3 firm oligopoly, a
merger to duopoly will naturally result in significant price increases. If the two merging firms are
at the same location, as they are when the HM test is applied to DFW, then an antitrust market
will exclude competition from Southwest just 12 miles away. On the other hand, the HM test is
redundant when applied to DAL as there is already an actual monopolist at that airport. As noted
in the Merger Guidelines, the HM test can only be performed in the presence of some minimum
level of competition.
Results of the HM test in the Dallas region illustrate a somewhat paradoxical feature of the
DOJ method for market delineation: product A may fall into product B’s relevant geographic or
product market, even if B does not fall into A’s. In this case, flights out of DAL exist in the same
18This intuition has been confirmed through conversations with economists at the DOJ who have worked on airline
merger investigations.
19These are the three destinations in our sample to which the Wright Amendment does not restrict travel from
DAL.
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antitrust market as those out of DFW, but those out of DFW exist in a separate antitrust market
from those out of DAL. However, as we will see below, substitution towards Southwest flights out
of DAL in the event of price increases at DFW is substantial. In this case the HM test indicates
where we are likely to see anticompetitive effect, but provides little guidance as to what is the set
of products between which consumers will readily substitute.
In general, the HM test is more indicative of the competitive environment at each airport than
it is of the degree of substitution between them. Estimates suggest that HOU and IAH exist within
the same antitrust market, but this has as much to do with the fact that routes out of these airports
are relatively concentrated as it does with the proximity of the two airports. In Colorado, DEN
appears to consitute a geographic market, while a HM at COS could not exercise market power
over the price of any nonstop product for the 3 destinations we consider due to a lack of nonstop
competition on these routes (DFW is the only destination of the three that is served nonstop by
more than one carrier out of COS). In Southeast Florida, a price increase of at least 5% is observed
for nonstop flights from MIA to ATL and from FLL to BOS, routes on which four different carriers
compete nonstop, but not on less competitive routes.
Critical loss analysis, also discussed in the Merger Guidelines, asks “whether imposing at least
a SSNIP on one or more products in a candidate market would raise or lower the hypothetical
monopolist’s profits.” In principle we should analyze what happens to the HM’s profits when the
price of each good in each market is individually raised 5%, but the sheer number of products
in some markets makes it difficult to report the results, and guarantees that in all markets that
are at least moderately competitive, there is at least one such product (usually a very unpopular
connecting flight). Thus, we report in table 8 the change in profits at each airport when prices are
raised 5% across the board.
Results of the critical loss analysis are similar to those obtained from the HM tests. An across-
the-board increase in prices of 5% is generally profitable when competition at an airport is high
and thus prices are significantly below the monopoly level, for example at the San Francisco Bay
Area airports. On the other hand, such an increase is not profitable when competition at an airport
is low, for example at DAL where Southwest is the only carrier, and thus already a monopolist at
that airport.
While we have followed the DOJ/FTC method for geographic market definition as precisely as
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Table 8: Critical loss analysis
Route Origin
∆ profits Carriers on route Miles to
if price ↑ Connecting Nonstop nearest airport
Colorado to LAS
COS -0.015 % 4 1 73 (DEN)
DEN -0.026 % 5 3 73 (COS)
Colorado to DFW
COS -0.120 % 5 2 73 (DEN)
DEN -0.588 % 7 4 73 (COS)
Colorado to PHX
COS -0.585 % 3 1 73 (DEN)
DEN -0.968 % 4 3 73 (COS)
Dallas to SAT
DAL -0.247 % 1 1 12 (DFW)
DFW 0.230 % 3 2 12 (DAL)
Dallas to AUS
DAL -0.224 % 1 1 12 (DFW)
DFW 0.763 % 3 2 12 (DAL)
Dallas to MSY
DAL -0.326 % 1 1 12 (DFW)
DFW 0.862 % 4 2 12 (DAL)
Houston to MSY
HOU -0.374 % 1 1 24 (IAH)
IAH -0.111 % 2 1 24 (HOU)
Houston to ATL
HOU -0.179 % 2 2 24 (IAH)
IAH -0.349 % 7 2 24 (HOU)
Houston to LAS
HOU -0.611 % 3 1 24 (IAH)
IAH -0.512 % 7 2 24 (HOU)
SE Florida to ATL
FLL -0.315 % 4 2 21 (MIA)
MIA -0.030 % 5 4 21 (FLL)
PBI -0.827 % 2 1 42 (FLL)
SE Florida to BOS
FLL 0.301 % 7 4 21 (MIA)
MIA -0.303 % 7 1 21 (FLL)
PBI -0.143 % 6 2 42 (FLL)
SE Florida to LAS
FLL 0.440 % 9 3 21 (MIA)
MIA -0.120 % 9 2 21 (FLL)
PBI -0.525 % 6 0 42 (FLL)
No California to LAS
OAK 0.215 % 4 3 11 (SFO)
SFO 0.518 % 6 5 11 (OAK)
SJC 0.873 % 4 3 30 (OAK)
SMF 0.370 % 3 2 75 (OAK)
No California to SAN
OAK -0.567 % 3 2 11 (SFO)
SFO -0.408 % 3 2 11 (OAK)
SJC 0.532 % 4 2 30 (OAK)
SMF 0.154 % 2 2 75 (OAK)
No California to SEA
OAK 0.055 % 2 2 11 (SFO)
SFO -0.112 % 3 2 11 (OAK)
SJC 0.810 % 5 3 30 (OAK)
SMF -0.117 % 3 2 75 (OAK)
Predicted changes in profits are for the 3rd quarter of 2000.
possible, it should be noted that relevant antitrust markets for merger analysis may be defined by
these agencies simultaneously along product and geographic dimensions. Thus, beginning with one
air travel product at one airport, we could proceed by adding a product at another airport before
adding more products at the same airport. In this way, we could conclude that the relevant market
includes products at more than one location. Since the choice of which products to include at what
stage of the HM test is arbitrary, and leads to different results depending on the order in which
the products are added, the results are not particularly useful for identifying a more intuititve
definition of a market as a set of products between which consumers substitute.
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6.2 Economic Markets
An exercise in which we raise the prices of individual products by 5% and observe substitution
patterns across products at geographically close airports provides a different, but more illuminat-
ing, perspective on the degree to which geographically differentiated products compete with one
another. Since our estimates suggest a strong preference for nonstop flights, we analyze substitu-
tion patterns between nonstop and connecting flights at different airports. If the price of a nonstop
flight from airport A is raised and substitution towards nonstop flights from airport B is stronger
than substitution towards connecting flights from airport A, then we believe it is reasonable to
consider these two airports to exist in the same geographic market.
For each origin region in our sample, we conduct this experiment for the most popular destina-
tion from that region. Once again, all results are computed using the third quarter of 2000.
Table 9: Substitution patterns when nonstop prices are raised, Colorado to LAS
UA DEN F9 DEN HP DEN AA COS
DEN nonstop 2.392 % 12.902 % 3.875 % 0.045 %
DEN conn 1.639 % 1.463 % 1.453 % 0.003 %
COS nonstop 0.023 % 0.005 % 0.005 % -
COS conn 0.008 % 0.001 % 0.001 % 2.481 %
Outside 95.939 % 85.630 % 94.666 % 97.471 %
Each column corresponds to a hypothetical increase in price of
that product of 5%. Each entry in that column represents the
percent of the market share lost as a result of that price increase
to each type of product.
Table 9 shows what happens when the price of each individual nonstop flight from Colorado to
LAS is raised 5%. As suggested by the DOJ exercises, flights out of COS and DEN do not appear
to compete with each other to any great degree. Most customers lost when the prices of nonstop
flights at either airport are raised 5% choose flights at the same airport, or the outside option of
not purchasing any product in our sample.
Table 10: Substitution patterns when nonstop prices are raised, Dallas to SAT
Product WN DAL AA DFW DL DFW
DAL nonstop - 1.131 % 0.763 %
DAL conn 0.301 % 0.282 % 0.191 %
DFW nonstop 7.921 % 12.174 % 32.843 %
DFW conn 0.032 % 0.036 % 0.034 %
Outside 91.747 % 86.378 % 66.170 %
Each column corresponds to a hypothetical increase in
price of that product of 5%. Each entry in that column
represents the percent of the market share lost as a
result of that price increase to each type of product.
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Flights out of DAL and DFW, on the other hand, appear quite substitutable (see table 10).
American Airlines and Delta offer more attractive nonstop options than Southwest, due to brand
preferences as well as the airlines’ hub status at DFW. As a result, there is more substitution towards
these popular products than there is away from them. In general, a good deal of substitution is
observed between products at the two airports, with far more substitution going to nonstop flights
at different airports than to connecting flights at the same airport. Similar patterns are observed
in the Houston area, with nonstop flights out of HOU and IAH proving better substitutes for one
another than connecting flights at either airport.
Table 11: Substitution patterns when nonstop prices are raised, Houston to MSY
Product WN HOU CO IAH
HOU nonstop - 4.421 %
HOU conn 0.219 % 0.423 %
IAH nonstop 25.439 % -
IAH conn 0.001 % 0.001 %
Outside 74.341 % 95.155 %
Each column corresponds to a hypothetical increase in
price of that product of 5%. Each entry in that column
represents the percent of the market share lost as a
result of that price increase to each type of product.
Turning to the more competitive markets in the sample, table 13 presents patterns of substi-
tution when prices of individual nonstop flights to ATL out of MIA, FLL and PBI are raised by
5%. For flights out of MIA and FLL, other nonstop flights out of either airport appear to be more
attractive substitutes than connecting flights out of either airport.20 Flights out of PBI, however,
appear to be significantly less substitutable.
Table 12: Substitution patterns when nonstop prices are raised, Florida to ATL
Product FL MIA UA MIA DL MIA AA MIA DL FLL FL FLL DL PBI
MIA nonstop 6.132 % 13.132 % 7.890 % 3.678 % 5.197 % 2.144 % 0.074 %
MIA conn 0.088 % 0.087 % 0.087 % 0.118 % 0.022 % 0.022 % 0.000 %
FLL nonstop 0.383 % 0.476 % 0.407 % 0.870 % 0.648 % 0.835 % 0.087 %
FLL conn 0.180 % 0.404 % 0.291 % 0.943 % 2.165 % 1.136 % 0.082 %
PBI nonstop 0.001 % 0.001 % 0.001 % 0.002 % 0.013 % 0.008 % -
PBI conn 0.000 % 0.000 % 0.000 % 0.000 % 0.000 % 0.000 % 0.039 %
Outside 93.145 % 85.901 % 91.323 % 94.389 % 91.954 % 95.856 % 99.717 %
Each column corresponds to a hypothetical increase in price of that product of 5%. Each entry
in that column represents the percent of the market share lost as a result of that price increase
to each type of product.
20Most nonstop products in the sample are offered out of MIA, while most connecting products in the sample
are offered out of FLL. This is why most substitution to nonstop flights goes to MIA, while most substitution to
connecting products goes to FLL.
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There are 13 nonstop products offered from the 4 major airports in Northern California to LAS,
the most popular destination in the sample. Table 14 shows substitution patterns when the prices
of select nonstop products are raised by 5%. It is clear that consumers find flights out of OAK and
SFO to be close substitutes for one another. SJC, at the bottom of the San Francisco Bay, is more
geographically differentiated, but the policy experiments suggest substantial substitution towards
products at OAK and SFO in response to price increases. As expected, products located at SMF
do not appear to be particularly close substitutes for any other air travel products in the Northern
California region.
Table 13: Substitution patterns when nonstop prices are raised, No California to LAS
Product WN OAK AA OAK N7 SFO UA SFO HP SJC AA SJC HP SMF WN SMF
OAK nonstop 8.365 % 5.322 % 7.082 % 4.825 % 1.199 % 1.064 % 0.007 % 0.007 %
OAK conn 6.689 % 6.341 % 3.633 % 4.664 % 0.608 % 0.703 % 0.004 % 0.005 %
SFO nonstop 14.18 % 11.401 % 12.411 % 4.718 % 1.867 % 3.485 % 0.010 % 0.015 %
SFO conn 8.247 % 4.640 % 5.076 % 41.625 % 0.620 % 2.332 % 0.007 % 0.012 %
SJC nonstop 0.899 % 0.972 % 1.003 % 1.350 % 6.989 % 7.307 % 0.001 % 0.001 %
SJC conn 1.273 % 1.083 % 0.984 % 3.445 % 13.709 % 27.278 % 0.001 % 0.002 %
SMF nonstop 0.002 % 0.002 % 0.001 % 0.003 % 0.000 % 0.000 % 1.896 % 3.196 %
SMF conn 0.004 % 0.003 % 0.001 % 0.020 % 0.000 % 0.001 % 7.543 % 9.182 %
Outside 60.340 % 70.237 % 69.810 % 39.360 % 75.007 % 57.832 % 90.531 % 87.581 %
Each column corresponds to a hypothetical increase in price of that product of 5%. Each entry in that
column represents the percent of the market share lost as a result of that price increase to each type of
product.
As mentioned in the introduction, researchers have typically defined a market as either an
airport-pair or a city-pair. Under the airport-pair definition, flights from all thirteen origin airports
in table 1 to a given destination would constitute thirteen different markets for air travel. Under
a city-pair definition, flights out of COS and DEN exist in separate markets, while flights out of
DFW and DAL exist in the same market. The policy experiments conducted in this section suggest
that the city-pair definition is the more correct definition of an economic market. Flights out of
airports within the same city are clearly substitutes for one another, while flights out of airports in
different cities do not appear to be.
7 Merger Simulations
A merger simulation is a tool used by antitrust practitioners as well as academic researchers to
simulate the potential anticompetitive effects of a merger. Given a structural model of demand,
an assumption on supply-side behavior yields a set of first order conditions which can be used to
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solve for marginal costs. When two firms in a market merge, these first order conditions change,
but if marginal costs do not then it is simple to solve the new first order conditions for the new
equilibrium prices. This method can be used to predict whether any particular merger is likely to
lead to substantial price increases, and thus if serious anticompetitive harm is likely. Nevo (2000a)
provides a more lengthy discussion of the methodology, as do Peters (2006) and Gayle (2007) in
the context of the airline industry.
As we have mentioned, researchers typically define markets for airline travel as directional
pairs of airports or cities, and in antitrust analysis time constraints may inhibit the careful use
of demographic location data in a structural utility model as presented here. We conduct merger
simulations using our sample and compare results to those obtained using city-pair and airport-pair
market definitions.21
In grouping our data into appropriate city-pairs, we follow the lead of previous authors who
have used this definition. In addition to HOU and IAH in Houston and DAL and DFW in Dallas,
we also group the three San Francisco Bay Area airports (OAK, SFO and SJC) together, as well
as MIA and FLL.22
There is no shortage of major post-2000 airline mergers to study. American bought a distressed
Transworld in the Spring of 2001, and America West bought US Airways in the Spring of 2005, a
deal that had been under discussion for several years at that point. More recently, Delta bought
Northwest in the Fall of 2008, the Department of Justice recently approved the purchase of Con-
tinental airlines by United, and Southwest Airlines recently agreed, in September 2010, to buy
Airtran. The results reported below, however, should not be used to draw wider conclusions about
the competitive implications of these particular mergers. The individual routes we choose to study
are not those that posed the largest competitive concerns at the time of the mergers, and all except
one of the mergers occurred long after the period of our sample.
A useful market in which to conduct merger simulations is the market for travel from South
Florida to Denver in the first quarter. This is a popular route due to ski/vacation travel, and as
21Demand estimation results using the same sample of data, but alternately using an airport-pair and city-pair
market definition (and not estimating the travel cost parameter γ) are presented in the appendix. We use these
results to conduct merger simulations.
22Berry and Jia (2010) group the Bay Area airports but leave MIA and FLL in different markets. Boguslaski, Ito
and Lee (2004) group MIA and FLL into the same city-pair market, due to the fact that airlines actively advertise
their products out of FLL as competing with those out of MIA. Given the substantial substitution between these two
airports evident in our model, we also group these two airports into the same city.
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a result many carriers offer nonstop service from at least one of MIA, FLL or PBI. For three of
the four mergers mentioned above, both carriers offered nonstop service to DEN from one of these
three airports.
Table 14: Predicted price increases as a result of merger: SE Florida to DEN, Q1
Merger Product
Predicted price changes
Full model City-pair Airport-pair
AA & TW
AA MIA 0.068 % 0.057 0.003 %
TW FLL 0.550 % 0.799 0.050 %
UA & CO
CO MIA 0.728 % 0.319 % 0.164 %
CO FLL 0.116 % 0.278 % 0.006 %
UA MIA 0.201 % 0.075 % 0.058 %
DL & NW
DL PBI 0.003 % 0.004 % 0.001 %
NW FLL 0.087 % 0.128 % 0.016 %
Taking the predicted price increases from the full model as the “correct” ones, we see that the
city-pair market definition in general outperforms the airport-pair definition. This is not surprising,
as each of these three mergers involves airlines competing out of different airports. Thus, in every
case, an airport-pair definition completely misses the changed incentives of a merged firm jointly
pricing nonstop flights out of geographically close airports (small price increases are still observed
due to the fact that most major carriers offer connecting service out of every airport in the sample).23
This is why the airport-pair definition drastically underpredicts price increases.24
Table 15: Predicted price increases as a result of merger: Northern California to BOS, Q4
Merger Product
Predicted price changes
Full model City-pair Airport-pair
HP & US
HP SFO 0.635 % 0.148 0.307 %
US SFO 1.388 % 0.412 0.837 %
Turning to the merger between America West and US Airways, we find a situation in which the
airport-pair definition outperforms the city-pair definition. This occurs for two reasons. First, the
only market in our data in which these two airlines both offer nonstop flights is Northern California
to BOS. In this market, five of the seven competing nonstop flights are offered out of SFO, and
23In the case of the DL-NW merger this is not true: DL only offers nonstop service out of PBI (and connecting
service out of the other two airports). This is why price increases are so modest.
24The merger simulations also generate predicted price changes on the part of rivals. In general, these changes were
small, and were frequently (just barely) negative. While we usually think of prices as strategic complements they
do not have to be, and Berry and Pakes (1993) note that “the BLP utility framework is sufficiently rich that prices
can be estimated to be either strategic complements or substitutes.” This is generally possible if margins are high
and if a rival’s price increase makes the demand curve steeper. This may be encouraging news for airline mergers: if
products are sufficiently differentiated firms may actually respond to a merger by lowering price to gain consumers
without a strong brand preference.
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none out of OAK. Thus, most of the competition for travel between Northern California and BOS
is occurring on the SFO-BOS route. As a result, an airport-pair market definition is actually quite
close to the correct one, as SMF is a poor substitute for travelers near the San Francisco Bay
Area and there is no nonstop competition out of OAK. Second, the city-pair market definition can
overstate the amount of competition between products at different geographic locations. Though
we have grouped SJC into the same city-pair definition as OAK and SFO, in reality SJC and SFO
are just over 30 miles apart, and for many consumers are separated by a large body of water. Thus,
the city-pair market definition overestimates the amount of substitution between SJC and SFO,
and thus under predicts the price increase that would potentially result from a merger of two firms
operating out of SFO.
It is interesting that both of the imperfect market definitions that are usually used to study
air travel tend to under-predict price increases. The city-pair definition overstates the amount of
substitution between geographically differentiated products, while the airport-pair definition misses
the incentives of a merged firm to jointly price products at different geographic locations.25
It is also worth noting the small size of the observed price increases. This is mostly due to the
fact that our sample does not contain the types of routes that would normally raise competitive
concerns for these particular mergers (for example, hub-hub routes on which the two merging
airlines represent most if not all of the nonstop traffic). Also, since we must compute average prices
for each itinerary in the sample, our model only explains percent changes in average prices. What
happens to the average price as the result of a merger may not be indicative of what happens to,
for example, the 90th percentile price.
8 Conclusion
We have estimated a structural model of demand in order to define as accurately as possible a
relevant geographic market for air travel. Our results suggest that the commonly used “city-pair”
market definition is a better representation of a true economic market for air travel than the
“airport-pair” definition, and is the appropriate one for economic and industry research. Using the
DOJ HM test, however, we confirm that the relevant definition of an antitrust market is frequently
25We have found that these two market definitions under-predict price increases when compared to the full model
estimated with or without the income interactions.
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an airport-pair, as a merger of all firms at a single airport will usually result in substantial exercise
of market power despite (and not because of a lack of) the presence of geographically differentiated
competition. Thus, the DOJ test leads to market definitions that seem intuitively narrow, and do
not contain all products which can reasonably be considered substitutes.
While we have applied our model to a specific industry, it is quite general and can be used to
study others. Where detailed data on individual consumers is unavailable, the spatial distribution
of consumers in and around products can be numerically “integrated-out” using the method shown
by BLP in order to estimate a travel-cost utility parameter. This parameter should be well identified
even on multiple observations of the same market over time, in contrast to the more commonly
estimated demographic interactions. It is our hope that models similar to this one can be used, along
with easily obtainable population census data, to study questions of geographic market definition
in other industries.
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Sample selection
In selecting the sample, our primary goal was to find multi-airport regions in the continental US
where the choice set of a potential traveler would be easy to define. After identifying candidate
regions containing more than one airport, we investigated the proximity of other airports by drawing
concentric circles around each origin airport and identifying airports falling within these circles.
If another airport existed within 90 miles, then flights from this airport were either added to the
consumer’s choice set, or the region containing this airport was eliminated from the sample. So,
while the Chicago, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C. and New York City areas are well known multi-
airport regions, defining the choice set for consumers is complicated by the proximity of Milwaukee,
San Diego, Philadelphia and Newark NJ/Hartford CT, respectively. We also avoided regions in
which much smaller capacity airports (not in the top 100 in passenger enplanements during the
calendar year of 2000) compete alongside larger airports.
After identifying 5 multi-airport regions that are sufficiently geographically isolated and contain
only “major” airports, we investigated which were the most popular destinations from each of those
regions. We chose, for each multi-airport region, the top 10 most traveled-to destination airports,
excluding airports in cities that contain more than one airport. Because many destination airports
were in the top 10 from more than one region, we have 21 destination airports in our sample.
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Full model
Below are the full results from the demand model, including estimated region, quarter and airline
fixed effects. We did not include dummy variables for small airlines that did not appear in two or
more origin regions in our sample, and for airlines for which there were less than 100 observations
in our sample. The set of carrier dummies we estimate is the same as those estimated by Berry
and Jia (2010) using 1999 data.
Table 16: Full results from the demand model
Variable Mean Income interaction
Constant -0.2297
(1.0763)
Price -0.7629 0.2334
(0.0950) (0.1497)
Stops -1.3281 -0.2226
(0.4221) (0.2729)
Destinations -0.0285 -0.0670
(0.0295) (0.0136)
Flight Distance 0.1412 -0.1214
(0.1551) (0.3074)
Distance from Airport (γ) -1.4552
(0.3551)
AA (American) 0.5538
(0.1943)
CO (Continental) -0.3953
(0.2182)
DL (Delta) 0.3226
(0.1812)
HP (America West) -0.2750
(0.1909)
NW (Northwest) -0.7827
(0.1682)
TW (Transworld) 0.2649
(0.2247)
UA (United) 0.8393
(0.1990)
US (US Airways) -1.0528
(0.1758)
WN (Southwest) -0.4699
0.2227
Region: Colorado -0.1362
(0.1947)
Region: Dallas -1.2021
(0.2713)
Region: Florida -2.1481
(0.6868)
Region: Houston -1.3522
(0.3255)
Quarter: 1 -0.0855
(0.0898)
Quarter: 2 -0.0748
(0.0826)
Quarter: 3 -0.0245
(0.0809)
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Airport pair
Below are the estimated parameters obtained using an airport pair market definition rather than
estimating the parameter γ. For consistency with the full model, in which we defined markets by
origin regions and estimated coefficients on region dummies, we include dummy variables for each
origin airport when we define markets by origin airport.
Table 17: Results from the airport-pair demand model
Variable Mean Income interaction
Constant -4.9173
(0.3192)
Price -0.8317 0.3050
(0.1655) (0.1985)
Stops -1.3328 -0.3529
(0.3913) (0.7563)
Destinations -0.0000 -0.0540
(0.0437) (0.0224)
Flight Distance 0.1412 -0.1214
(0.1551) (0.3074)
AA (American) 0.1898
(0.1902)
CO (Continental) -0.6246
(0.2282)
DL (Delta) -0.0697
(0.2484)
HP (America West) -0.3330
(0.1828)
NW (Northwest) -0.9867
(0.2286)
TW (Transworld) 0.1436
(0.3008)
UA (United) 0.4743
(0.2300)
US (US Airways) -1.4493
(0.2220)
WN (Southwest) -1.1234
0.2227
SMF 1.2898
(0.2633)
OAK 0.6852
(0.4917)
SJC 1.4700
(0.4222)
SFO 0.8211
(0.4329)
HOU 0.9516
0.1979
IAH 0.2630
(0.2399)
DAL 2.3616
(0.8216)
DFW 0.2753
(0.5375)
DEN 0.9196
(0.4910)
COS 1.8576
(0.4954)
MIA -0.2737
(0.1427)
PBI 0.5357
(0.2088)
Quarter: 1 -0.0375
(0.0746)
Quarter: 2 -0.1331
(0.0950)
Quarter: 3 -0.0595
(0.1008)
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City pair
Below are the estimated parameters obtained using a city pair market definition rather than es-
timating the parameter γ. For consistency with the full model, in which we defined markets by
origin regions and estimated coefficients on region dummies, we include dummy variables for each
origin city when we define markets by origin city.
Table 18: Results from the city-pair demand model
Variable Mean Income interaction
Constant -4.2130
(0.5184)
Price -0.7946 0.1078
(0.5484) (0.3347)
Stops -5.2705 3.1112
(0.9231) (0.5303)
Destinations 0.0554 -0.0302
(0.0160) (0.0100)
Flight Distance 0.4232 0.0565
(0.5031) (0.3470)
AA (American) 0.2602
(0.1509)
CO (Continental) -0.6897
(0.1411)
DL (Delta) -0.1754
(0.1126)
HP (America West) -0.2235
(0.1205)
NW (Northwest) -1.1220
(0.1211)
TW (Transworld) -0.0538
(0.1512)
UA (United) 0.3864
(0.1338)
US (US Airways) -1.4114
(0.1198)
WN (Southwest) -0.3634
0.1691
CO Springs 1.0093
0.1637
Dallas -0.4307
(0.1395)
Denver 0.2018
(0.1832)
Miami -0.3188
(0.0.1390)
Houston -0.8191
(0.1686)
Palm Beach -0.5068
0.1273
Quarter: 1 -0.1287
(0.0650)
Quarter: 2 -0.0592
(0.0642)
Quarter: 3 0.0101
(0.0631)
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